THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
301
light, and moved early, but there was great delay in forming them forbattle, owing principally to the absence of Law’s brigade, for which it wouldhave been well to substitute Anderson’s fresh division, which could havebeen replaced by Pettigrew’s, then in reserve. There seems to have been110 good reason why the attack should not have been made by 8 or 9 a. m.a, t the latest (but see p. 351 ), when the Federal Third Corps was not yet allU P, nor Crawford’s division, nor the Artillery Reserve, nor the Sixth Corps,Hud our lines were still very incomplete. This is one of the cheap criticismsHfter all the facts on both sides are known; but it is apt for its purpose,as it shows how great a risk Meade took in abandoning his Pipe Creekline for Gettysburg on the chances of Lee’s army not yet being assembled;a nd also, that there was no lack of boldness and decision on Meade ’s part.Indeed, his course, from the hour that he took command, had been markedby these qualities.
A suggestive incident is worth recording here. In the course of my inspec-tion of the lines that morning, while passing along Culp’s Hill, I found ther nen hard at work intrenching, and in such fine spirits as at once to attracta ttention. One of them finally dropped his work, and, approaching me, in-quired if the reports just received were true. On asking what he referredt°> he replied that twice word had been passed along the line that GeneralblcClellan had been assigned to the command of the army, and the secondlinie it was added that he was on the way to the field and might soon beExpected. He continued, “ The boys are all jubilant over it, for they knowthat if he takes command everything will go right.” I have been told recentlyby the commander of a Fifth Corps battery that during the forced march ofH' e preceding night the same report ran through that corps, excited greate ntliusiasm amongst the men, and renewed their vigor. It was probablyb'om this corps—just arrived—that the report had spread along the line. |
On my return to headquarters from this inspection General Meade told melhat General Sickles, then with him, wished me to examine a new line, as hethought that assigned to him was not a good one, especially that he could notj* Se his artillery there. I had been as far as Round Top that morning, andUad noticed the unfavorable character of the ground, and, therefore, I accom-panied Sickles direct to the Peach Orchard, where he pointed out the ridges,a h’eady described, as his proposed line. They commanded all the grounde hiud, as well as in front of them, and together constituted a favorablePosition for the enema 1 ° hold. This was one good reason for our takingPossession of it. It would, it is true, in our hands present a salient angle,^bich generally exposes both its sides to enfilade fires; but here the ridgest p‘ re so high that each would serve as a “ traverse ” for the other, and reduceHat evil to a minimum. On the other hand it would so greatly lengthen
4 Li
of the
lle utenant O. S. Barrett, in a pamphlet sketch
18 88]
> relates a similar occurrence in the SecondHe
‘W,
af . • ■ ^ arrived at llano® rn °on of July 1st.
came riding along, saying, ‘Boys, keep up goodcourage, McClellan is in command of the armyagain.’ Instantly the space above was filled withthe hats and caps of the gratified soldiers. . . .I knew this was untrue myself, but it served itspurpose, as intended.”— Editors.