THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

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extension of his lines; it would have required both the Third and the Fifthcorps, and left him without any reserve. Had he known that Lee’s attackwould be postponed until 4 p. m., he might have occupied this line in theCorning; but he did not know this, expected an attack at any moment, and,111 view of the vast interests involved, adopted a defensive policy, andordered the occupation of the safe line. In taking risks, it would not be forhis army alone, but also for Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. Get-tysburg was not a good strategical position for us, and the circumstancesUnder which our army was assembled limited us tactically to a strictly defen-sive battle. But even a strictly defensive battle gained here would be, in itsresults, almost as valuable as an offensive one with a brilliant victory, since itWould necessarily be decisive as to both the campaign and the invasion, andits moral effect abroad and at home, North and South, would be of vastimportance in a political as well as a military sense. The additional risks ofa n offensive battle were out of all proportion to the prospective gains. Thedecision then to fighta defensive ratherthan an offensive bat-ty*, to look rather tos °lid than to brilliantResults, was wise.

After finishing mylamination I return-e d to headquartersa Ud briefly reportedt° General Meade thattye proposed line wasa good one in itself,that it offered favor-able positions for ar-tillery, but that itsNations to other lines were such that I could not advise it, and suggestedthat he examine it himself before ordering its occupation. He noddedas sent, and I proceeded to Cemetery Hill.

The cannonade there still continued; it had been commenced by the enemy,a Ud was accompanied by some movements of troops toward our right. As soonas I saw that it would lead to nothing serious, I returned direct to the Peach

i’chard, knowing that its occupation would require large reenforcements ofai ‘tillery. I was here met by Captain Randolph, the corps chief of artillery,^ho informed me that he had been ordered to place his batteries on the newhfle. Seeing Generals Meade and Sickles, not far off, in conversation, andsupposing that General Meade had consented to the occupation, I sent at once0 the reserve for more artillery, and authorized other general officers to drawthe same source. Here, perhaps, I may be allowed to say en passant thathis large reserve, organized by the wise forethought of General McClellan ,s °metimes threatened with destruction, and once actually broken up, was often,

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weed’s position on little round top, looking in the direction

OP THE PEACII ORCHARD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.