3i4 THE 20TH MAINE AT LITTLE ROUND TOP.
each member and his answer taken down, and whenit came to Newton, who was the first in rank, hevoted in pretty much the same way as I did, and wehad some playful sparring as to whether he agreedwith me or I with him; the rest voted to remain.
The next question written by Butterfield was,“ Should the army attack or wait the attack of theenemy f ” I voted not to attack, and all the othersvoted substantially the same way; and on the thirdquestion, “How long shall we wait?” I voted,“ Until Lee moved.” The answers to this lastquestion showed the only material variation in theopinion of the members.
When the voting was over General Meade saidquietly, but decidedly, “ Such then is the decision ” ;and certainly he said nothing which produced adoubt in my mind as to his being perfectly in accordwith the members of the council.
In 1881 (eighteen years after the battle) I w-asshown in Philadelphia, by General Meade ’s son[Colonel George Meade ], a paper found amongstGeneral Meade ’s effects after his death. It wasfolded, and on the outside of one end was written,in his well-known handwriting, in ink, “Minutesof Council, July 2d, ’63.” On opening it, the follow-ing was found written in pencil in a handwriting[General Daniel Butterfield ’s] unknown to me:
Minutes of Council, July 2d, 1863.
Page 1, Questions asked:
1. Under existing circumstances is it advisable forthis army to remain in its present position, or to retireto another nearer its base of supplies %
2. It being determined to remain in present position,shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy l
3. If we wait attack, how long 1
Page 2, Replies.
Gibbon : 1. Correct position of the army, but would
not retreat. 2. In no condition to attack,in his opinion. 3. Until he moves.
Williams: 1. Stay. 2. Wait attack. 3. One day.
Birney: Same as General Williams.
Sykes: “ “ “
Newton: 1 . Correct position of the army, but would notretreat. 2. By all means not attack. 3.If we wait it will give them a chance tocut our line.
Page 3.
Howard: 1. Remain. 2. Wait attack until4 p. m. to-morrow. 3. If don’t attack, attack them.
Hancock: 1. Rectify position without moving so as to
give up field. 2. Not attack unless ourcommunications are cut. 3. Can’t waitlong; can’t be idle.
Sedgwick: 1. Remain. [2.] and wait attack. [3.] Atleast one day.
Slocum : Stay and fight it out.
[On the back, or first page of the sheet]:
Slocum stay and fight it out. Newton thinks it a badposition; Hancock puzzled about practicability of retir-ing; thinks by holding on inviting & to mass forces andattack. Howard favor of not retiring. Birney don’tknow. Third Corps used up and not in good condition tofight. Sedgwick doubtful whether we ought to attack. ZtEffective strength about 0000,12,500, 9000, 0000, 8500, 6000.7000. Total, 58,000.
[Endorsement ;J
Minutes of Council, held Thursday, P. M., July 2d,1863. I), n., m. G., c. of s. [Daniel Butterfield , Major-General, Chief of Staff].
The memoranda at the bottom of the paper weredoubtless made while the discussion was going on,and the numbers at the foot refer probably to theeffective strength of each corps. 4
Several times during the sitting of the councilreports were brought to General Meade , and nowand then we could hear heavy firing going on overon the right of our line. I took occasion beforeleaving to say to General Meade that his staff-offi'cer had regularly summoned me as a corps com-mander to the council, although I had some doubtsabout being present. He answered, pleasantly,“ That is all right. I wanted you here.”
Before I left tlio house Meade made a remark tome which surprised me a good deal, especially whenI look back upon tho occurrence of the next day.By a reference to the votes in council it will beseen that the majority of tho members were infavor of acting on the defensive and awaiting theaction of Lee. In referring to the matter, just asthe council broke up, Meade said to me, “ If Leeattacks to-morrow, it will be in your front.” I askedhim why he thought so, and he replied, “Becauseho has made attacks on both our flanks and failed,and if he concludes to try it again it will be on ° urcenter.” I expressed the hope that he would, andtold General Meade , with confidence, that if he didwe woidd defeat him.
3) The words in italics, noted as illegible in the “Offi-cial Records,” have been deciphered on a careful exam-ination of tho original document deposited by ColonelGeorge Meade with the Penn. Hist. Society .— Editors.
4A careful study of the original suggests thatthese notes “ at tlio bottom ” (on tho back) were mad®before the questions were formulated. Pee p. 313.
EDITORS.
THE 20th MAINE AT LITTLE BOUND TOP. |
BY II. S. MELC1IER, 20TII MAINE REGIMENT.
T he Confederate force designated to take pos-session of Little Bound Top appears to havebeen Robertson’s brigade, consisting of the 1st,4th, and 5th Texas and the 3d Arkansas ; andLaw’s brigade, consisting of the 4tli, 44tli, 48th,47th, and loth Alabama , both of Hood’s division.The former was to assault in front, while Law’sbrigade was to attack in the rear of the hill [seep. 318]; but Bobertson, finding he could not coverthe entire front with his brigade, detached the
j. Condensed from the “Lincoln County News,”
44th, 48tli, and 4tli Alabama from Law’s brigadeabout the time they arrived at the foot of BoundTop in their advance and connected them withRobertson’s line, then well in front of Little BoundTop. This left the 47tli and 15th Alabama tocarry out tho flanking movement alone, which theydid, passing up tho southern side of Round Top,and halting some ten minutes on the crest for rest-This halt proved fatal to the success of their un-dertaking, as it enabled our brigade (Vincent’s)