T he Second Division of the Twelfth Corpscamped on the night of the first day under theshadow of Little Round Top. About G o’clock thenext morning it was marched over from that point,which was then the extreme left of our line, andposted on Culp’s Hill, its left forming a right anglewith the right of General Wadsworth’s division ofthe First Corps. Our brigade, commanded byBrigadier-General George S. Greene and compris-ing five New York regiments, the 60th, 78th,102d, 137th, and 149th, was on the left of thedivision, and our regiment, the GOth, was on theleft of the brigade. This regiment was largelycomposed of men accustomed to woodcraft, andthey fell to work to construct log breastworkswith unaccustomed heartiness. All instinctivelyfelt that a life-and-death struggle was impending,and that every help should be used. Culp’s Hillwas covered with woods; so all the materialsneedful were at our disposal. Right and left themen felled the trees, and blocked them up intoa close log fence. Piles of eordwood which laynear by were quickly appropriated. The sticks,set slanting on end against the outer face of thelogs, made excellent battening. All along the restof the line of the corps a similar defense was con-structed. Fortunate regiments, which had spadesand picks, strengthened their work with earth.By 10 o’clock it was finished.
At 6 o'clock in the evening General Meade , find-ing himself hard pressed on the left, and deemingan attack on the right wing improbable at so latean hour, called for the Twelfth Corps. Our brigadewas detailed to remain and hold the lines of thecorps. Word was brought from the officer incharge of our pickets that the enemy was advan-cing in heavy force in line of battle, and, with allpossible celerity, such dispositions as the case ad-mitted of were made. The brigade was strung outinto a thin line of separate men as far along thebreastworks as it would reach. The intention wasto place the men an arm’s-length apart, but, by thetime the left of the brigade had fairly undoubledfiles, the enemy was too near to allow of furtherarrangements being made.
In a short time the woods were all flecked withthe flashes from the muskets of our skirmishers.Down in the hollow there, at the foot of the slope,you could catch a glimpse now and then, by theblaze of the powder, of our brave boys as theysprang from tree to tree, and sent back defiance to
•fe On the 25th of February, ISM, General Meade madethe following substitution in his official report:
“ The detachment of so large a portion of the TwelfthCorps, with its temporary commander, Brigadier-General A. S. Williams, left the defense of the line pre-viously held to the remaining brigade of the SecondDivision, commanded by Brigadier-General Greene ,who held the left of tho Twelfth Corps, now becomethe extreme right of the army. The enemy, perceivingtho withdrawal of our troops, advanced and attackedGeneral Greene with great vigor, who, making a gallant
the advancing foe. With desperation they clung toeach covering. For half an hour they obstructedthe enemy’s approach.
The men restrained their nervous fingers; thehostile guns flamed out against us not fifteenyards in front. Our men from the front weretumbling over the breastwork, and for a breath-less moment those behind the breastwork waited.Then out into the night like chain-lightning leapedthe zigzag line of fire. Now was the value ofbreastworks apparent, for, protected by these,few of our men were hit, and feeling a sense ofsecurity, we worked with corresponding energy.Without breastworks our line would have beenswept away in an instant by the hailstorm ofbullets and the flood of men. The enemy workedstill farther around to our right, entered thebreastwork beyond our line, and crumpled upand drove back, a short distance, our extremeright regiment. They advanced a little way, butwere checked by the fire of a couple of smallregiments borrowed for the emergency from Gen-eral Wadsworth, and placed in echelon.
General Meade hardly mentioned this affair atthe breastworks in his original report of the bat-tle, and those who were there think justice hasnever been done in the case,-& and that whatwas thero achieved has never been adequatelyapprehended and stated by any writer.
The left of our brigade was only about eightyrods from tho Baltimore turnpike, while the rightwas somewhat nearer. Thore were no supports.All the force that there was to stay the onset wasthat one thin line. Had the breastworks not beenbuilt, and had there been only the thin line of ourunprotected brigade, that line must have beenswept away like leaves before the wind, by the on-coming of so heavy a mass of troops, and the pikewould have been reached by the enemy. Onceon the pike, the Confederate commander wouldhave been full in the rear of one-tliird of our army,firmly planted on the middle of the chord of thearc upon which that portion was posted. Whatthe effect must have been it is not needful to de-scribe. The least disaster would have sufficed toforce us from the field.
During the night our commanders brought backthe remainder of the corps, and, stumbling uponthe enemy’s pickets, found out what had takenplace, something of which until that moment theyhad been entirely unaware.
defense, and being soon reenforced by portions of theFirst and Eleventh corps, contiguous to him, succeededin repulsing all tho offorts of the enemy to dislodgehim.”
Also, on tho same day, in reply to a letter from Gen-eral Slocum on the subject, General Meade wrote i' 1part:
“ I am willing to admit that, if my attention had beencalled to the services of Greene’s Brigade in tho pointedmanner it now is, I would have given it credit for thisspecial service.” Editors.
316