338
of the nature and magnitude of this struggle by McLaws ’s and Hood’sdivisions than is contained in General Meade ’s report. He says:
“ About 3 P. m. I rode out to the extreme left. . . . Having found Major-General Sickles, Iwas explaining to liim that he was too far in the advance, and discussing with him the proprietyof withdrawing, when the enemy opened upon him with several batteries, in his front andflank, and immediately brought forward columns of infantry and made a vigorous assault. TheThird Corps sustained the shock most heroically. Troops from the Second Corps were imme-diately sent by Major-General Hancock to cover the right flank of the Third Corps, and soonafter the assault commenced the Fifth Corps most fortunately arrived and took position onthe left of the Third, Major-General Sykes, commanding, immediately sending a force to occupyRound Top Ridge, where a most furious contest was maintained, the enemy making desperatebut unsuccessful efforts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the ThirdCorps under Major-General Birney (Major-General Sickles having been wounded early in theaction), superiority in numbers of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advanceposition, General Birney was compelled to fall back and re-form behind the line originallydesigned to be held.
“ In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth Corps, Major-General Sedgwick, and part of the First Corps to the command of which I had assigned Major-General Newton, particularly Lockwood’s Maryland Brigade, with detachments from the SecondCorps, were all brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with a gallant resist-ance of the Fifth Corps, in cheeking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy, who retiredin confusion and disorder about sunset, and ceased any further efforts on our extreme left.” i
These mighty shocks of contending armies were sustained, on our part, bytwo divisions of infantry numbering, with the artillery, not more than 10,000,or at the highest estimate 13,000 men.
Kershaw’s brigade remained unemployed during the 3d of July, in the posi-tion it held the evening before, along the stony hill and wood. It will beevident to the reader that the causes of the failure of the operations heredescribed to achieve greater results, may be reduced to one, to wit: the wantof simultaneous movement and cooperation between the troops employed. Acareful examination of all that has been written of that eventful series of bat-tles will show that this was the cause of all the failures. Every attack wasmagnificent and successful, but failed in the end for the want of cooperationbetween corps, divisions, brigades, and, in some instances, regiments of thesame brigade. The want of cooperation, or, as the Comte de Paris termsit, the want of “ coordination,” caused the loss of Gettysburg to the Con-federates. It will be seen, too, that there was no loss of time on the partof McLaws ’s division, from the day it left Culpeper to that of its arrival atGettysburg . If any ensued after that, it was due to circumstances whollyunknown to the writer. Certainly, the loss of time, if any, would not have lostthe fight, if there had been perfect cooperation of all the troops. But, exceptto vindicate the truth, it is vain to inquire into the causes of our failure.
4 . In a supplementary report, General Meade amended this paragraph so as to include the First Division
of the Twelfth Corps. Lockwood’s brigade belonged to the Twelfth Corps, unattached.— EditobS.