340
our original plans. If we had fallenbehind Meade and had insisted onstaying between him and Washing-ton, he would have been compelled toattack and would have been badlybeaten. General Lee answered, “ No;they are there in position, and I amgoing to whip them or they are goingto whip me.” I saw he was in noframe of mind to listen to further ar-gument at that time, so I did not pushthe matter, but determined to renewthe subject the next morning. It wasthen about 5 o’clock in the afternoon.
On the morning of the 2d I joinedGeneral Lee and again proposed themove to Meade’s left and rear. Hewas still unwilling to consider theproposition, but soon left me and rodeoff to see General Ewell and to exam-ine the ground on our left with a viewto making the attack at that point.After making the examination andtalking to General Ewell, he determined to make the attack by the right,and, returning to where I was, announced his intention of so doing. Hisengineer officers had been along the line far enough to find a road by whichthe troops could move and be concealed from the Federal signal stations.
About 11 o’clock on the morning of the 2d he ordered the march, and putit under the conduct of his engineer officers, so as to be assured that the troopswould move by the best route and encounter the least delay in reaching theposition designated by him for the attack on the Federal left, at the sametime concealing the movements then under orders from view of the Federals.
McLaws ’s division was in advance, with Hood following. After marchingsome distance there was a delay in front, and I rode forward to ascertain thecause, when it was reported to me that part of the road just in advance ofus was in plain view of the Federal signal station on Round Top. To avoidthat point the direction of the troops was changed. Again I found there wassome delay, and ordering Hood’s division, then in the rear, to move on anddouble with the division in front, so as to save as much time as possible, 1went forward again to see the cause of the delay. It seemed there was doubtagain about the men being concealed, when I stated that I could see the sig'nal station, and there was no reason why they could not see us. It seemedto me useless, therefore, to delay the troops any longer with the idea of con-cealing the movement, and the two divisions advanced. As the line wasdeployed I rode along from left to right, examining the Federal position andputting my troops in the best position we could find. General Lee at the
aEsys: