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Finding that Meade was not going to follow us, I prepared to withdraw myline to a better defensive position. The batteries were withdrawn well overSeminary Ridge, and orders were sent to the right for McLaws ’s and Hood’sdivisions to be withdrawn to corresponding positions. The armies remainedin position, the Confederates on Seminary Ridge extending around Gettys-burg , the left also drawn back, the Federals on Cemetery Ridge, until thenight of the 4th, when we took up the march in retreat for Virginia.
That night, while we were standing round a little fire by the roadside,General Lee said again the defeat was all his fault. He said to me at anothertime, “ You ought not to have made that last attack.” I replied, “ I had my°rdei*s, and they were of such a nature there was no escape from them.”During that winter, while I was in east Tennessee , in a letter I received fromhim lie said, “ If I only had taken your counsel even on the 3d, and had movedaround the Federal left, how different all might have been.”
The only thing Pickett said of his charge was that he was distressed at theloss of his command. He thought he should have had two of his brigadesthat had been left in Virginia; with them he felt that he would have brokenthe line.
While I was trying to persuade General Lee to turn the Federal left on the1st of July, Halleck telegraphed Meade as follows :
“ Washington, D. C. , July 1st, 1863.
“ The movements of the enemy yesterday indicate his intention to either turn your left, or to°over himself by the South Mountain and occupy Cumberland Valley. Do not let him drawy°u too far to the east.”
Again on the same day :
“ • . . Your tactical arrangements for battle seem good, so far as I can judge from my
knowledge of the character of the country; but in a strategic view, are you not too far east,an d may not Lee attempt to turn your left and cut you off from Frederick ? Please give yourGil attention to this suggestion. ...”
The next day, just thirty minutes before my assault, General Meade tele-graphed General Halleck at 3 p.m.:
“• . . If I find it hazardous to do so [meaning to attack], or am satisfied that the
e nemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shallGil back to my supplies at Westminster. ...”
From this we know that the ground of the Gettysburg cemetery couldhave been occupied without the loss of a raau, yet even at this late day, some°f the Virginians, not satisfied with the sacrifice already made, wish that I,^ho would and could have saved every man lost at Gettysburg , should nowhe shot to death.
. hf we had made the move around the Federal left, and taken a strong posi-tion, we should have dislodged Meade without a single blow; but even if wehad been successful at Gettysburg , and had driven the Federals out of theirstronghold, we should have won a fruitless victory, and returned to Virginiac °nquered victors. The ground they occupied would have been worth noGore to us than the ground we were on. What we needed was a battle that