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desperate battles, I cannot admit that he, blindfold, ever led or ordered hisnext in rank, also blindfold, into night marches through the enemy’s lines togain position and make a battle at daylight next morning.
In articles formerly published on this charge of General Pendleton, massesof evidence were adduced showing that my column when ordered to the right,east of the Emmitsburg road, was conducted by General Lee ’s engineer offi-cer ; that when halted under the conduct of that officer I doubled the reardivision on the leading one so as to save time; that my arrangements werepromptly made, and that my attack was made many hours before any of ourother troops were ready to obey their orders to cooperate. As I was the onlyone prepared for battle, I contended against the Federal army throughout thecontest with two divisions and some misguided brigades sent to cover my left.
Colonel Taylor, of General Lee ’s staff, takes exception to the delay in theattack of Pickett on the last day under the impression that, had I attacked ear-lier and before Edward Johnson was driven from the Federal right, the latterWight have held his ground longer and to some advantage to the Confeder-ates. He seems to lose sight of the fact that General Lee , not I, was com-manding our left under Johnson, and that he alone could order concert ofaction. On the 2d, notwithstanding his orders to move in concert with myattack at 4 p. m., Johnson did not go in till 8 at night, long after my battlew as ended. Colonel Taylor thinks the forlorn-hope should have gone insooner. The universal opinion now is that it should not have gone in at all;a nd, as already stated, that was the opinion General Lee expressed soon afterthe battle.
Some of our North Carolina troops seem to consider the less conspicuouspart given them a reflection upon them as soldiers of true mettle and dash.This sensitiveness is not well founded. Every officer of experience knowsthat the best of veteran soldiers, with bloody noses from a fresh battle, arebever equal to those going in fresh in their first stroke of the battle. HadPickett’s men gone through the same experience as the other troops on the1st, they could not have felt the same zest for fighting that they did comingbp fresh and feeling disparaged that the army had won new laurels in theira bseuce. There is no doubt that the North Carolinians did as well as anySoldiers could have done under the circumstances. I can truthfully attestthat the old North State furnished as fine and gallant troops as any thatfought, in the Confederate ranks — and that is saying as much as can be saidPw soldiers. They certainly made sufficient sacrifice, and that was all we had^ e ft to do on that day.
During the Franco-Prussian war I kept a map of the field of operations^mth colored pegs, that were moved from day to day to indicate the move-ments of the two armies. Bazaine had been driven to shelter at Metz,McMahon had been driven back to the route leading from Paris to Metz andSe eraed in doubt whether he would go to Paris or to Bazaine ’s relief. Hesuffered himself to be forced north of the route between these points. Onae morning that the wires brought us that information, two or three ofbe French Creoles of New Orleans visited my office to ask my views of the