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THE GREAT CHARGE AND

the skill that would direct our efforts. There seemed to be a prevalent feel-ing that fortune now favored us and that victory or defeat now dependedsolely on ourselves.

Except in equipment, I think a better army, better nerved up to itswork, never marched upon a battle-field. But many of our infantry stillcarried smooth-bore muskets, and our artillery ammunition was inferior,especially that of the rifles. The Confederacy did not have the facilities formuch nice work of that sort, and we had to take what we could get withoutrigid inspection. How our rifled batteries always envied our friends in theopposition their abundant supply of splendid ammunition ! For an unreliablefuse or a rifle-shell which “ tumbles ” sickens not only the gunner but thewhole battery, more than “ misfires ” at large game dishearten a sportsman.There is no encouragement to careful aiming when the ammunition fails, andthe men feel handicapped. But for all our confidence that Providence hadnow at last consented to “ come down and take a proper view of the situa-tion,” as one of our good chaplains used to pray, there was a very naturalanxiety to know how the enemy had fought the day before at Gettysburg .As we met the wounded and staff-officers who had been in the action, Iremember many questions asked on that subject. There was no great comfortto be derived from the answers, which were generally in profane simile.Indeed, I have heard survivors of the war say since that some of the Federalfighting that day equaled or surpassed any they ever saw from first to last.

We marched quite steadily, with a good road and a bright moon, untilabout 7 A. m. on the 2d, when we halted in a grassy open grove about a milewest of Seminary Ridge, and fed and watered. Here, soon afterward, I wassent for by General Longstreet, and, riding forward, found him with GeneralLee on Seminary Ridge. Opposite, about a mile away, on Cemetery Ridge,overlooking the town, lay the enemy, their batteries making considerabledisplay, but their infantry, behind stone walls and ridges, scarcely visible.In between us were only gentle rolling slopes of pasture and wheat-fields,with a considerable body of woods to the right and front. The two RoundTops looked over everything, and a signal-flag was visible on the highest.Instinctively the idea arose, “ If we could only take position here and havethem attack us through this open ground!” But I soon learned that wewere in no such luck — the boot, in fact, being upon the other foot.

It was explained to me that our corps was to assault the enemy’s left flank,and I was directed to reconnoiter it and then to take charge of all the artilleryof the corps and direct it in the attack, leaving my own battalion to the com-mand of Major Huger. I was particularly cautioned, in moving the artillery,to keep it out of sight of the signal-station upon Round*Top. J

^This suggests the remark that I have neverunderstood why the enemy abandoned the use ofmilitary balloons early in 1863, after having usedthem extensively up to that time. Even if theobservers never saw anything, they would havebeen worth all they cost for the annoyance anddelays they caused us in trying to keep our move-

ments out of their sight. That wretched littlesignal-station upon Bound Top that day causedone of our divisions to lose over two hours, andprobably delayed our assault nearly that long.During that time a Federal corps arrived nearBound Top and became an important factor in theaction which followed.—E. P. A.