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Our own line on the ridge was in more or less disorder, as the result of theconflict, and in no condition to advance a sufficient force for a counter-assault. The largest bodies of organized troops available were on the left,and General Meade now proceeded to Round Top and pushed out skirmishersto feel the enemy in its front. An advance to the Plum Run line, of thetroops behind it, would have brought them directly in front of the numerousbatteries which crowned the Emmitsburg Ridge, commanding that line andall the intervening ground; a farther advance, to the attack, would havebrought them under additional heavy flank fires. McCandless’s brigade,
supported by Kevin's, was, however, pushedforward, under cover of the woods, which pro-tected them from the fire of all these batter-ies; it crossed the Wheat-field, cleared thewoods, and had an encounter with a portionof Benning’s brigade, which was retiring.Hood’s and McLaws ’s divisions were fallingback under Longstreet’s orders to their strongposition, resting on Peach Orchard and cover-ing Hill ’s line. It needs but a moment’s ex-amination of the official map to see that ourtroops on the left were locked up. As to thecenter, Pickett’s and Pettigrew’s assaultingdivisions had formed no part of A. P. Hill ’sline, which was virtually intact. The idea
colonel eliakim shekrill, commanding that there must have been “ a gan of at leastsecond corps, killed jdly 3 , 1863 . a mile ” in that line, made by throwing forward
from a piioTOGRAi H. these divisions, and that a prompt advance
from Cemetery Ridge would have given us the line, or the artillery in front_of it, was a delusion. A prompt counter-charge after a combat between twosmall bodies of men is one thing; the change from the defensive to theoffensive of an army, after an engagement at a single point , is quite another.This was not a “ Waterloo defeat” with a fresh army to follow it up, and tohave made such a change to the offensive, on the assumption that Lee hadmade no provision against a reverse, would have been rash in the extreme.An advance of 20,000 men from Cemetery Ridge in the face of the 140 gunsthen in position would have been stark madness; an immediate advancefrom any point, in force, was simply impracticable, and before due preparationcould have been made for a change to the offensive, the favorable momenthad any resulted from the repulse — would have passed away.
Whilst the main battle was raging, sharp cavalry combats took place onboth flanks of the army. On the left the principal incident was an attackmade by order of General Kilpatrick on infantry and artillery in woods andbehind stone fences, which resulted in considerable losses, and especially inthe death of General Farnsworth, a gallant and promising officer who hadbut a few days before been appointed brigadier-general and had not y e ^received his commission. On the right an affair of some magnitude took