382
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Map 28.July 13th.
-wstovm
vs XJ>
jMartmsburg
Sharps
shepherds town
REFER
EHCES.
Confederate.
Union.
Infantry. |_J
Longbtreet’s C'ps.. L.
1st Corps..
.1
2d Corps....
A. V. Hill’s C’ps. .H.
3d Corps....
..3
5th Corps...
6th Corps...
. 6
SCALE Of Ml LES
.11
.12
Cavalry' ....
.13
Meade, fully alive to tlie im-portance of striking Lee beforelie could cross the Potomac, dis-regarded this, advanced on the11th, and on the 12th pushedforward reconnoissances to feelthe enemy. After a partial ex-amination made by himself andhis chiefs of staff and of engi-neers, which showed that itsflanks could not be turned, andthat the line, so far as seen bythem, presented no vulnerablepoints, he determined to make ademonstration in forceon the next morning,the 13th, supported bythe whole army, and
p t '/£RELL
PTO**
1
• >->
usburg
Sharpsiburg*
fS Sheplierdstowu
<A
•4^0
Iseetown.
Harp era Fej-n
to attack if a prospect of suc-cess offered. On assemblinghis corps commanders, how-ever, he found their opinionso adverse that he postponedit for further examination,after which he issued the or-der for the next day, the 14th.
On advancing that morning,it was found that the enemyhad abandoned his line andcrossed the river, partly byfording, partly by a newbridge.
A careful survey of the en-emy’s intrenched line after itwas abandoned justified theopinion of the corps com-manders against an attack, as
it showed that an assault would have been disastrous to us.that Meade in overriding that opinion did not shrink fromsibility, notwithstanding his own recent experience at Gettysburg the enemy’s attacks on even partially intrenched lines had failed. Iferred on this occasion it was on the side of temerity.
But the hopes and expectations excited by the victory of Gettysburg weieas unreasonable as the fears that had preceded it; and great was the disap-
It proved als°a great respon-rg, where all