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CONFEDERATE PRISONERS ON TIIE BALTIMORE PIKE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
discredit under all circumstances the Army of the Potomac and any com-mander identified with it,—and that was the effect in this case.
The losses of both armies were very large. The revised returns show forthe Army of the Potomac: killed, 3072; wounded, 14,497; missing, 5434,—total, 23,003 ; and for the Army of Northern Virginia: killed, 2592; wounded,12,709; missing, 5150,— total, 20,451. But the returns for the latter armyare not complete; some commands are not reported, and in others the regi-mental show larger losses than do the brigade returns from which the fore-going numbers are compiled.
As to the comparative strength of the two armies on the field of battle, wehave no satisfactory data. The last Confederate return was for May 3lst,showing “Present for duty, under arms,” 59,484, infantry. The morningreport of the Army of the Potomac for June 30tli shows “ Present for duty,equipped,” 77,208, infantry. Neither return is worth much except as a basis
distinguished officers, after inspecting Lee’s vacatedworks and position. Among these officers I could nameGenerals Sedgwick, Wright, Slocum, Hays, Sykes, andothers.
“ The idea that Lee had abandoned his lines early inthe day that he withdrew, I have positive intelligenceis not correct, and that not a man was withdrawn untilafter dark. I mention these facts to remove the im-pression which newspaper correspondents have giventhe public: that it was only necessary to advance tosecure an easy victory. I had great responsibilitythrown on me: on one side were the known and im-portant fruits of victory, and on the other, the equallyimportant and terrible consequences of a defeat. Iconsidered my position at Williamsport very differentfrom that at Gettysburg . When I left Frederick it waswith the firm determination to attack and fight Leewithout regard to time or place as soon as X could comein contact with him. But, after defeating him and re-quiring him to abandon his schemes of invasion, I did
not think myself justified in making a blind attac,simply to prevent his escape, and running all the rl .attending such a venture. Now, as I said before, 1this perhaps T erred in judgment, for I take this ooca^ 0to say to you, and through you to the l’rosident—th aI have no pretensions to any superior capacitypost ho has assigned me to —that all I can do is to®ert my utmost efforts and do the best I can; but t-lmthe moment those who havo a right to judge my actionthink or feel satisfied either that I am wanting,that another would do better, that moment I earnesdesire to be relieved, not on my own account, butaccount of the country and the cause. You must ° xCl \, eso much egotism, but your kind letter in a meas ^renders it necessary. I feel, General, very proudyour good opinion, and assure you I shall endeavortlio future to continue to merit it. 'Reciprocatingkind feeling you have expressed, I remain,most truly and respectfully yours, George G. Mea *Major-General.” editors