manders. A “staff-officer” is an officer attachedto the person or headquarters of a general as hisaide or assistant.
To illustrate the general principle as to theservice of the special arms, I quote from the “In-structions of Frederick the Great” to his artillery.He was himself, by the way, an “ artillery spe-cialist” of the highest order, yet I have neverheard it suggested that this unfitted him for “or-dering a line of battle.” He was also a disciplin-arian of the sternest school, yet he “almostpreached insubordination ” in order to reduce toa minimum the mischief that meddling with theartillery by any general, even the general-in-chief, might occasion. He says:
“ It sometimes happens that the general in command,or some other general, is himself forgetful, and ordersthe fire to be opened too soon, without considering whatinjurious consequences may result from it. In suchcase the artillery officer must certainly obey, but heshould lire as slowly as possible, and point the pieceswith the utmost accuracy, in order that his shots maynot be thrown away.”
As to the other question, that of policy, eachgeneral must decide it for himself, and GeneralHancock presumably acted according to his bestjudgment in the emergency suddenly presentedto him when the cannonade opened. I do notknow his reasons for countermanding my orders,and therefore cannot discuss them, even were Idisposed to do so. As to the hypothetical casepresented by General Walker, the possible effectof the enemy’s cannonade on the morale of ourtroops, and his question, “Who was the betterjudge, General Hunt or General Hancock?” I maybe permitted to reply, that a corps commanderought to be, so far as his own corps is concerned.It is, however, one of the necessary duties of an
artillery commander to study the qualities of theother arms, for these must be considered in or-ganizing and distributing the artillery, and are,as we see in this very ease, important elementsin determining its service. I had studied theArmy of the Potomac, believed in its high quali-ties, and when, for special reasons, I instructedour batteries to withhold their fire for a givenperiod, I knew the severity of the trial to whichI was subjecting all the troops. I knew, also,that while the batteries would be the direct objectof the enemy’s fire, their men must stand idle atthe guns and bear its full fury, while the infantry,lying on the reverse slope of the ridge and out ofthe enemy’s sight, would be partly sheltered fromit. Yet I felt no misgiving as to the fortitude ofmy cannoneers, and no doubt as to that of the in-fantry. I think I was justified by the event, forthe troops on General Hancock’s line, where myinstructions were not followed, and those onGeneral Newton’s line (on Hancock’s immediateleft), where they were followed, were equal in“heart and courage” for the “fearful ordeal ofLongstreet’s charge.” The object of my orders,however, was to spare them this ordeal altogetherby breaking up the charge before it reached ourlines. Had my orders been fully carried out, Ithink their whole line would have been—as halfof it was—driven back before reaching onr posi-tion, and this would have given us our onlychance for a successful counter-attack. As itwas, the splendid valor of Pickett’s division aloneenabled the Confederates, although defeated, topreserve their morale intact. Had they been re-pulsed without coming into immediate contact -withour infantry, their morale would have been seriouslyimpaired, their sense of superiority humbled.
T HE brigades of Harrow, Webb, and Hall, of Gib-bon’s division, Hancock’s corps, occupied thecrest, on Cemetery Ridge on July 3d. The right°f Hall’s and the left of Webb’s brigades were in aclump of trees, called by the enemy the salient°f our position, and this grove was the focus of the"lost fearful cannonade that preceded Pickett’scharge. One regiment, the 72d Pennsylvania , inWebb’s command, was a little in rear of the left ofits brigade; two regiments, the 19th Massachu-setts and 42d New York, Colonel A. F. Devereuxcommanding, of Hall’s brigade, were in rear ofthe right of their brigade.
Prom the opposite ridge, three-fourths of a mileaway, a line of skirmishers sprang lightly forward°ut of the woods, and with intervals well keptmoved rapidly down into the open fields, closelyfollowed by a line of battle, then by another, andb y yet a third. Both sides watched this never-to-be-forgotten scene,—the grandeur of attack ofSo many thousand men. Gibbon’s division, whichWas to stand the brunt of the assault, looked withadmiration on the different lines of Confederates,
marching forward with easy, swinging step, and themen were heard to exclaim: “Here they come! ”“Here they come! ” “Here comes the infantry !”
Soon little puffs of smoke issued from the skir-mishline, as it came dashing forward, firing in replyto our own skirmishers in the plain below, andwith this faint rattle of musketry the stillness wasbroken ; never hesitating for an instant, but driv-ing our men before it, or knocking them over by abiting fire as they rose up to run in, their skirmishline reached the fences of the Emmitsburg road.This was Pickett’s advance, which carried a frontof five hundred yards or more. I was just in rearof the right of the brigade, standing upon a largebowlder, in front of my regiment, the 19th Massa-chusetts, where, from the configuration of theground, I had an excellent view of the advancinglines, and could see the entire formation of theattacking column. Pickett’s separate brigadelines lost their formation as they swept acrossthe Emmitsburg road, carrying with them theirchain of skirmishers. They pushed on toward thecrest, and merged into one crowding, rushing line,