CHICKAMAUGA—THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WEST.

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day announced that Bragg’s headquarters would he, that I might get instruc-tions for the next day. On the way I learned from some soldiers that Breckin-ridge was coming up from Lee and Gordon’s. I sent Captain Reid to h im toconduct him to Cleburne’s right. General Polk, however, as wing commander,gave General Breckinridge permission to rest his weary men, and took himto his own headquarters. It was after 2 o’clock when General Breckinridgemoved off under the guidance of Captain Reid, and his division did not getinto position until after sunrise. Captain Coleman and myself reached theford after midnight, only to learn that Bragg was not there. Some time afterthe unsuccessful search, my other staff-officers came up, and my chief-of-staffgave me a message from General Polk that my corps had been put under hiscommand, and that he wished to see me at Alexander’s Bridge. He said nota word to any of them about an attack at daylight, nor did he to GeneralBreckinridge, who occupied the same room with him that night. I have byme written statements from General Breckinridge and the whole of my staffto that effect. General Polk had issued an order for an attack at daylight,and had sent a courier with a copy, but he had failed to find me. I saw theorder for the first time nineteen years afterward in Captain Polk’s letter tothe Southern Historical Society . At 3 a. m. on the 20th I went to Alexan-der’s Bridge, but not finding the courier who was to be posted there to conductme to General Polk, I sent Lieutenant Morrison, aide-de-camp, to hunt himup and tell him I could be found on the line of battle, which I reached justafter daylight, before Breckinridge had got into position. Neither of mydivision commanders had heard anything of the early attack, and cookedrations were being distributed to our men, many of whom had not eaten any-thing for twenty-four hours. At 7: 25 an order was shown me from GeneralPolk, directed to my major-generals, to begin the attack. I sent a note tohim that I was adjusting my line, and that my men were getting their rations.Polk soon after came up, and assented to the delay. Still nothing was saidof the daylight attack. Bragg rode up at 8 A. m. and inquired of me why Ihad not begun the attack at daylight. I told him that I was hearing then forthe first time that such an order had been issued and had not known whetherwe were to be the assailants or the assailed. He said angrily, “ I found Polkafter sunrise sitting down reading a newspaper at Alexander’s Bridge, twomiles from the line of battle, where he ought to have been fighting.”

However, the essential preparations for battle had not been made up tothis hour and, in fact, could not be made without the presence of the com-mander-in-chief. The position of the enemy had not been reconnoitered, ourline of battle had not been adjusted, and part of it was at right angles withthe rest; there was no cavalry on our flanks, and no order had fixed thestrength or position of the reserves. My corps had been aligned north andsouth, to be parallel to the position of the enemy. Cheatham’s division was atright angles to my line, and when adjusted was \found to be exactly behindStewart’s, and had therefore to be taken out after the battle was begun, andplaced in reserve. Kershaw’s brigade of Longstreet’s corps was also out ofplace, and was put in reserve.