CHICKAMAUGA — THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE IVEST.

657

numbers and superiority in position and equipment. But tbeir unsurpassedand unsurpassable valor was not thrown away. Before a single Confederatesoldier liad come to their relief, Roseerans ordered up other troops to the aidof Thomas, in addition to those already mentioned. At 10:10 a. m. he orderedMcCook to be ready at 10:30; Sheridan’s division to support Thomas.

General McCook says that he executed the order and marched the men atdouble-quick. This weakening of his right by Roseerans to support his leftwas destined soon to be his ruin. So determined had been the assaults ofBreckinridge and Cleburne, that, though repulsed and badly punished, theywere not pursued by the enemy, who did not venture outside of his works.

At 11 A. M. Stewart’s division advanced under an immediate order fromBragg. His three brigades under Brown, Clayton, and Bate advanced withWood of Cleburne’s division, and, as General Stewart says, “pressed on pastthe corn-field in front of the burnt house, two or three hundred yards beyondthe Chattanooga road, driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments.. . . Here they encountered a fresh artillery fire on front and flank, heavily

supported by infantry, and had to retire.”

This was the celebrated attack upon Reynolds and Brannan which leddirectly to the Federal disaster. In the meantime our right was preparingto renew the attack. I proposed to the wing commander, Polk, to make asecond advance, provided fresh troops were sent forward, requesting that thegap in Breckinridge’s left, made by the withdrawal of Helm, should be filledby another brigade. General J. K. Jackson’s was sent for that purpose, butunfortunately took its position too far in rear to engage the attention of theenemy in front, and every advance on our right during the remainder of theday was met with flank and cross fire from that quarter. Gist’s brigadeand Liddell’s division of Walker’s corps reported to me. Gist immediatelyattacked with great vigor the log-works which had repulsed Helm so disas-trously, and he in turn was driven back. Liddell might have made as greatan impression by moving on the Chattanooga road as Breckinridge had done,but his strong brigade (Walthall’s) was detached, and he advanced withGovan’s alone, seized the road for the second time that day, and was movingbehind the breastworks, when, a column of the enemy appearing on his flankand rear, he was compelled to retreat.

This was simultaneous with the advance of Stewart. The heavy pressureon Thomas caused Roseerans to support him by sending the divisions ofNegley and Yan Cleve and Brannan’s reserve brigade. In the course of thesechanges, an order to Wood , which Roseerans claims was misinterpreted, ledto a gap being left into which Longstreet stepped with the eight brigades(Bushrod Johnson’s original brigade and McNair’s, Gregg’s, Kershaw’s, Law ’s,Humphreys’s, Benning’s, and Robertson’s) which he had arranged in threelines to constitute his grand column of attack. Davis’s two brigades, one ofVan Cleve’s, and Sheridan’s entire division were caught in front and flankand driven from the field. Disregarding the order of the day, Longstreet nowgave the order to wheel to the right instead of the left, and thus take in reversethe strong position of the enemy. Five of McCook’s brigades were speedily