NOTES ON THE CH1CKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.
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and artillery, disintegrating Van Cleve’s division,destroyed its further usefulness in this battle.
Rosecrans, seeing this appalling demolition ofhis right wing, and finding that the enemy hadinterposed between him and Thomas, hastenedaround to Rossville. Finding there men of Negley’sdivision, which he had supposed to be with Thomas,Rosecrans thought the day lost, and deemed it hisduty to hasten to Chattanooga , there to preparefor the reception and disposition of what seemedto him his disordered and defeated army. Rose-crans and Garfield, his chief-of-staff, separated atRossville — Rosecrans riding to Chattanooga andGarfield to Thomas at the front. Rosecrans saysthat he sent Garfield to the front; while Garfieldhas many times said that he himself insisted upongoing—that the sound of the battle proved thatThomas was still holding the enemy in check.McCook and Crittenden soon joined Rosecrans atChattanooga ; but Thomas remained on the field.Brannan brought his division to a good position,but so far to the right of Reynolds that the spaceof a division lay open between them. While Wood was moving toward this gap, Longstreet, advancingto complete the work, came within musket-range.
The moment was critical, because if Wood should be unable to occupy and hold the gap,Longstreet would pass through, permanently cutoff Brannan, again turn, and then overwhelmReynolds, and attack the rear of Palmer, Johnson,and Baird, who were still confronted by Polk.Wood coolly changed front under fire, so as to facesouth instead of east, and caused one of his bri-gades to charge with fixed bayonets. The au-dacity of the charge probably made the enemybelieve that there was force enough near to sus-tain it, for they soon bolted, and then fled out ofrange just before our bayonets reached their ranks.The needed moments were snatched from the en-emy, and Wood brought his division into the gapbetween Reynolds and Brannan.
Except some fragments from the broken divi-sions, our lino was now composed of Baird’s, John-son’s, Palmer’s, Reynolds’s, Wood ’s, andBrannan’sdivisions, naming them from left to right. In frontstood the whole army of the enemy, eager to fallupon us with the energy that comes from greatsuccess and greater hopes. But close behind ourline rode a general whose judgment never erred,whose calm, invincible will never bent; and aroundhim thirty thousand soldiers resolved to exhaustthe last round of ammunition, and then to holdtheir ground with their bayonets. Soldiers thusinspired and commanded, are more easily killedthan defeated.
For five long hours the shocks and carnage wereas close and deadly as men could make them.Thomas often came within speaking distance ofhis men, and wherever the energy of the attackmost endangered our line, he strengthened it withcannon and regiments drawn from points in lessperil; and when the soldiers asked for more am-munition Thomas said: “Use your bayonets.”At about 3:30 in the afternoon I saw GeneralThomas looking in the direction of Chattanooga ,
watching with anxious interest a column of dustrising in the air. Our suspense was relieved whenGranger and Steedman emerged from the dust, andGarfield dashed up to Thomas.
To prevent a turning movement on the roadfrom Ringgold, through Rossville to Chattanooga ,Granger, with three brigades, had been stationedon the Ringgold road; and, by a sound, soldierlyjudgment, leaving one brigade to do the workassigned to the three, brought two brigades tothe- field. Thomas himself was then only a lit-tle way down the rear slope of the low ridge onwhich Wood ’s division was fighting, with everyman in the line, and with no reserves. We werehard pressed, and many muskets became so hotthat loading was difficult; but Thomas sent uptwo cannon with the words: “The position mustbe held.” The reply was: “Tell General Thomasthat we will hold the position or go to heavenfrom it.”
At about 4 o’clock Longstreet drew back andasked for reiinforcements, but was answeredthat the right wing was already so shattered thatit could not aid him. He then brought forwardhis reserves and re-formed his lines ; and, extend-ing beyond our right, advanced in a final attack.
Thomas ordered Granger’s reenforcements tothe right of Brannan, where the enemy had alreadybegun to appear. The conflict there, and on thedivisions of Brannan and Wood , was soon at itsfiercest. Our short-range ammunition from thecannon cut great gaps through the enemy’s col-umns, and the steady volleys of musketry, aidedby our bayonets, did their remorseless work forabout thirty minutes; and then the Confederateleft wing, shattered, bleeding, defeated, withdrewfrom sight. The battle was ended — Thomas hadsaved the army.
The sun had not yet gone down, and there wastime enough to renew the action, but Bragg, if wemay trust his official report, had lost two-fifths ofhis infantry; his army was incapable of makinganother effort. What now would have been theconsequences if General Rosecrans had come uponthe field with ammunition and the few thousandsoldiers collected near Rossville ?
On the 21st Bragg was too prudent to attack,and on the 22d our army was placed in positionsaround Chattanooga .
Of our men under fire, we had lost more thanone-tliird, and a number of batteries in the woodsfell to the enemy by the disaster on the morningof the 20th. About 30,000 men—both sides —were killed and wounded in this battle.
On the 23d and 24th the Confederates cameslowly into position on Missionary Ridge and Look-out Mountain, connecting the two by a line ofearth-works across Chattanooga Valley; and, bysending a force into Lookout Valley, they com-manded our 2G-mile wagon route to Bridgeport forsupplies. This forced us to an almost impassablemountain route of sixty miles to the same point.Knowing that it would be impossible long to sub-sist an army by this route, Bragg waited the proc-ess of starvation with some probability of success.