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of these plans. Certainly he is as against theclaim of General Grant. But as to Rosecrans, letus see what General Thomas himself says. In hisreport, dated November 7th, 1863, of “The Bat-tle of Wauhatchie,” he says :
“ Preliminary steps liad already been taken to executethis vitally important movement before tbe commandof the department devolved on me. The bridge whichit was necessary to throw across the river at Brown’sFerry to gain possession of the northern end of LookoutValley and open communication with Bridgeport byroad and river was nearly completed.”
If all this had been accomplished by GeneralRosecrans, the plan must have been under hisconsideration with his approval for some weeksprior to his removal.
On November 4th, 1863, in the report of the
part taken by the troops under him of the move-ment that actually opened up the road to Brown’sFerry and Kelley’s Ferry, General Smith says :
“ On the 19th of October I was instructed by GeneralRosecrans to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity ofWilliam’s Island with a view of making the island acover for a steamboat landing and store-houses, etc.”
I do not wish to appear as detracting from thehonor that belongs to General Smith, who exe-cuted the plan, to General Thomas, who orderedthe execution, to General Grant, who approvedthe plan, but I think the truth of history calls fora repetition of the statement as made by GeneralThomas that he took up the work where his prede-cessor in command left it, and that he carried outthe plan of General Rosecrans in the final move-ment.
III. POSTSCRIPT BY GENERAL W. P. SMITH.
General Rosecrans never said anything to meabout a bridge into Lookout Valley, or a movementby Hooker’s command from Bridgeport, although1 was his chief engineer and troops under my com-mand were making boats for bridges. Mr. Danatelegraphed to Mr. Stanton early in October thatRosecrans would throw a bridge from MoccasinPoint into Lookout Valley. A bridge from Mocca-sin Point could not have been thrown, for the noseof Lookout Mountain was strongly held by the en-emy, and if the bridge had been thrown it couldnot have been maintained, as it would have beenunder close fire of artillery.
Mr. Dana also telegraphed to Mr. Stanton thatRosecrans had ordered Hooker to concentrate histroops with a view to moving his force throughthe Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley. Ifthat could have been done the operations atBrown’s Ferry were useless, as it would havebeen only necessary to throw a bridge after thearrival of Hooker’s troops in that Valley. WithBragg’s force, the passes in the Raccoon Mountaincould have been held so as to make it impossiblefor Hooker to get through them.
Shortly after my arrival at Chattanooga I toldGeneral Rosecrans that he could not supply hisarmy over the mountain roads as soon as the fallrains began. He said I was mistaken, that he wasgetting double the number of rations that he used.I never said anything more on the subject. Seeingthat we were daily falling behind, even after thetroops had been put on half rations, I tried tohurry on the defenses, and was all the time tryingto work out some plan for shortening the line ofsupplies. It seemed to me that, by holding thecountry between Bridgeport and the RaccoonMountain and the nose of Raccoon Mountainwhere it struck the Tennessee River, we might useWilliam’s Island as a depot of supplies, the trans-portation from Bridgeport being by water. Deter-mined to go and see if such a plan were practica-ble, I went to General Rosecrans on the eveningof the 18th of October and said, “General, I wishto go down the river to-morrow to see if we cannothold the river as far as William’s Island , and usethat for a depot.” General Rosecrans said, “ Go,
by all means, and I will go with you.” We startedat an early hour the next morning, but after cross-ing the river General Rosecrans stopped to gothrough the hospital and I pushed on and madethe examination entirely alone. When I reachedcamp General Rosecrans had been relieved; heleft that night, I think, and I did not say a wordto him about what I had discovered and what Ihad to propose. It is impossible that Rosecranscould have developed any plan for opening theriver to General Thomas which was satisfactory toThomas, for any plan would have required a bridgeto be thrown below Chattanooga , and GeneralThomas directed me, when I went to report tohim the next da.y, to throw a bridge at the town.That would have left nothing for another bridge,and it took time to prepare boats and bridgomaterials.
General Rosecrans could not have informed hisgenerals, with whom he was on confidential terms,of any such plan, for when Thomas explained myplan to them they opposed it strongly, and it tooktwo or three interviews to get General Thomas toadopt the plan. Finally it was carried ont exactlyas I had suggested it. General Thomas was a verycareful man about his statements and was veryparticular in his use of words. In his order howas careful to give mo credit for planning as wellas executing, and if he had had any such plangiven to him by General Rosecrans he would cer-tainly have not committed the injustice of givingme the credit for the plan.
General Cist’s quotation from my report refersonly to the William’s Island project, which I gaveup as soon as I saw the gronnd, and that may liavobeen an idea of General Rosecrans, but he cer-tainly had never taken any steps to find out if itwere practicable, which I found it was not. Inever heard of Brown’s Ferry till I saw it. I didnot report on it to Rosecrans, and I do not believethat Rosecrans had matured any scheme for short-ening the line of communications. If he had, whydid he not execute it; for at the time ho was re-lieved the Army of the Cumberland could not haveremained a week at Chattanooga , under the thenexisting lines for obtaining supplies.