750

LONGSTREET AT KNOXVILLE.

attack upon the left of the assaulting column onlyin case of its success, unwilling to see the assaultfail without trying it themselves, rushed forwardto the ditch. Longstreet endeavored to have themstopped, but was too late. They repeated the scenesof the first attack, and after losing nearly two hun-dred men they likewise withdrew. The ranks werere-formed, however, close behind the line of the

VERTICAL SECTION OF FORT 8ANDER3.

enemy’s rifle-pits, which our sharp-shooters stilloccupied. It had been a bloody repulse, thoughoccupying but about forty minutes, j)

Soon after the repulse I heard, with great de-light, that Jenkins had asked and obtained per-mission to make a fresh attempt, for I felt theutmost confidence that a concentrated fire by day-light from our 34 guns and mortars, with 1000sharp-shooters whom we could shelter within closerange, could silence the fort entirely, enabling astorming column to plant ladders, fill the ditchwith fascines, and cut footholds in the scarp, sothat an overwhelming force might reach the in-terior. But before arrangements could be madeLongstreet received official intelligence of Bragg’sdisaster and an order to abandon the siege ofKnoxville and to move promptly to join Bragg.A renewal of the attack was, therefore, thoughtinexpedient, and orders were at once given tomove all trains to the rear, in preparation for aretreat southward that night.

Under cover of night it was intended that weshould abandon the siege and get a good start onour march to join Bragg, but before nightfall wegot news from Bragg himself that a large forceunder Sherman was being moved to intercept us,and that an early junction with him was impos-sible. Under these circumstances it was finallydecided to remain and threaten Knoxville as longas possible, and draw Sherman off from the pursuitof Bragg, and then to retreat northward into eastTennessee. We remained before Knoxville untilthe night of December 4tli.

About noon the next day we encamped at Blain’sCross-roads , having made eighteen miles; thatwas, I think, about the very worst night march Iever went through. The roads were in fearful

Jj Our losses had been 129 killed, 458 wounded, and226 captured,— total, 813. The enemy’s loss inside thefort was, I believe, only about 20.— E. P. A.

\ Grade's brigade had quite a sharp engagement here,General Grade being severely wounded, and Kershaw’sand Bushrod Johnson’s brigades and two of my bat-teries were slightly engaged; but darkness came onbefore we could get a sufficient force into position andline, and under cover of it the enemy retreated. It hadbeen intended to cut off his retreat with a force of cav-alry, but the plan miscarried in some way— as plans arealways liable to do. Our loss was 290, more than half of

condition, and in the inky darkness and pouringrain neither men nor animals could see. Fre-quently guns or wagons would be mired so thatthe column behind would be blocked in the muduntil extra teams and men at the wheels couldset the column going for a few minutes. Strictorders had been given that the men should not usefence rails for fuel, but that night they wereignored, and miles of fence w.ere fired merely tolight up the road.

I recall some incidents illustrating how poorlyour army was provided with even prime necessa-ries, although we were in our own country. Wewere so badly off for horse-shoes that on the ad-vance to Knoxville we stripped the shoes from allthe dead horses, and we killed for the purposeall the wounded and broken-down animals, bothour own and those left behind by the enemy.During the siege the river brought down to us anumber of dead horses and mules, thrown in withinthe town. We watched for them, took them out, andgot the shoes and nails from their feet. Our menwere nearly as badly off as the animals — perhapsworse, as they did not have hoofs. I have myselfseen bloody stains on frozen ground, left bythe barefooted where our infantry had passed.We of the artillery took the shoes off the driversand gave them to the cannoneers who had tomarch.

Early in the advance Longstreet gave permissionto the men to “swap” shoes with the prisonerswhenever any were taken, but each man wasstrictly required to have something to “ swap,”and not leave the prisoner barefoot. It was quitean amusing sight (to us) to see a ragged rebel withhis feet tied up in a sort of raw beef-hide mocca-sin, which the men learned to make, come up to asquad of prisoners, inspect their feet, and selectthe one he would “swap” with. Generally, how-ever, the prisoners took it all very good-humoredly,guyed one another, and swapped jokes also withthe swappers. It looked a little rough, but, as oneof the victims said, “ When a man is captured, hisshoes are captured too.”

On Sunday the 6th we marched fifteen milesfarther, to Rutledge ; on the 8th seventeen more,to Mooresburg; and on the 9tli nine more, in thedirection of Rogersville. Here we remained untilthe 14th, when we marched back, hoping to beable to surprise and capture a small force of theenemy that had followed us to Bean’s Station andhad become separated from its support. \

We spent the winter between Russellville andGreenville , living off the country,having occasional

it in Grade’s brigade. This virtually ended tlio fightingof the campaign, in which our entire losses were 198killed, 850 wounded, 248 missing,— total, 1296. Burnside’slosses were 92 killed, 393 wounded, and 207 missing,—total, 692.—E. P. A.

The Union force at Bean’s Station consisted of 4000cavalry, under General Shackelford, who led tlio ad-vance of a column commanded by General Parke.Parke, with the infantry, was approaching, and senta division against Martin’s cavalry, preventing thoflank movement here referred to as having miscar-ried.— Editors.