14
It is not true that this attack was a surprise. The commander of MorrisIsland and all the troops on it knew that the enemy was preparing to makeone from Little Folly. I knew it as well. The real cause of the Federal suc-cess on the 10th of July was the insufficiency of our infantry force on MorrisIsland, let alone the fact that I could not, for want of necessary labor, com-plete the battery already referred to, and which was of no service whateverto us on that occasion.Nor should it be forgotten that the enemy, in orderto divert our attention from the main object he had in view, was not oidylanding troops at the southern end of Morris Island, but was also seriouslythreatening James Island, and had made a strong demonstration against it bythe Stono Fiver. It is clear to me that, but for my determination not toweaken my force there for the support of Morris Island, this demonstrationwould have been converted into a real attack, the results of which might havebeen far more disastrous; for, as I have already stated, James Island was theavenue of approach I dreaded the most to see selected, and which on thataccount I feared the enemy would select. It was, in reality, the gatewayto the avenue which would have almost assuredly led into the heart ofCharleston . The enemy had preferred breaking in through the window,and I certainly had no cause to regret it. He was held in check there, andnever got in until we finally opened the gate ourselves toward the end ofthe war.
On the evening of July 10th detachments from various Oeorgia reg-iments which I had called for began to arrive. I pressed the War Depart-ment for Clingman’s brigade. Paid of it came on the 12th. The day before,at early dawn, the enemy assaulted Battery Wagner, but was repulsedwith great loss to him. Two Federal officers and some 95 men were killedwithin pistol-range of our works. We captured six officers and about 113men. Most of them were wounded. Three monitors and three woodengun-boats assisted the Federal land forces on that occasion. BatteryWagner was again shelled on the 12th by part of the fleet, while the
out on each flank numerous skirmishers, who very soonsucceeded in flanking and taking tlie flatteries in re-verse. After an obstinate resistance our artillery liadto abandon their pieces,— three 8-inch navy shell guns,two 8-incli sea-coast howitzers, one. rifled 24-i>ounder,one 30 -pounder Parrott, one 12 -pounder Whitworth, three10 -ineh sea-coast mortars,—eleven in all, and fall flack.
“ Two companies of the 7tli South Carolina Battalion,which arrived about this time, were ordered to the sup-port of the batteries; but they could not make headagainst the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.
“ This success of the enemy threatened to cut off ourinfantry engaged at Oyster Point from their line ofretreat; and, consequently, about 9 o’clock ColonelGraham gave the order to fall back to Battery Wagner,which was accomplished under a severe flanking Arcfrom tlie monitors. The enemy thus gained possessionof the south end of Morris Island by rapidly throwinga large number of troops across the inlet, which It wasimpossible for the available infantry on tlie spot, aboutfour hundred effective men, to resist. It was not theerection of works on Little Folly Island that caused theabandonment of our position; it was clearly the wanton our side of infantry support, and the enemy’s supe-rior weight and number of guns, and the heavy sup-porting brigade of infantry that swept away our feeble,stinted means of resistance.” (1. r J\ B.
j) Tlie following table shows wlnit force I coulddispose of, at the time, in and around Charleston ,that is to say, in all the First Military District ofSouth Carolina . I had:
1. — On Janies Island-
Infantry. 1184
Heavy and light artillery. 1509
Cavalry. 153
- 2900
2. —On Morris Island —
Infantry. 012
Heavy and light artillery. 289
Cavalry. 20
- 927
3. —On Sullivan’s Island —
Infantry. 204
Heavy and light artillery. 720
Cavalry. 228
-1158
Infantry. 402
Heavy and light artillery. 235
Cavalry. 153 850
Total. 6841
G. T. B.