50

THE BOAT ATTACK ON SUMTER.

T1IE BOAT ATTACK. ON TOUT 8UMTKR.

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filled with men pouring a murderous fire down onour defenseless party, and heavy missiles and hand-grenades helped on the work of destruction. Be-fore this fire had fully developed, two boats fromthe Powhatan and others had effected a landing.As was subsequently learned, their crews andofficers were driven to shelter and taken prisoners.All these things were evidences of the enemy’sforeknowledge of our purpose and complete prep-aration to frustrate it. The “corporal’s guard”that we were to have encountered proved to exceedour own numbers. Under these conditions but oneexpedient was left—to effect an early withdrawal.The order to retire was accordingly given throughLieutenant Forrest, and was several times repeated.

Admiral Dahlgren , who was watching the opera-tions from a boat in the distance, says in his jour-nal, “ Moultrie fired like a devil, the shells break-ing around me and screaming in chorus.” Whatmust have been the impression in the midst of thecyclone, where the air was blazing with burstingshells, and the ear was deafened with the roar ofcannon, the rattle of musketry, the whistling ofgrape, and the explosion of hand-grenades !

Withdrawing in the barge from the vortex ofthe fire, we remained near the fort to afford assist-ance to any disabled comrades, and about 4o’clock, as day broke, we pulled to the flag-ship toreport the results of the assault and determine theextent of our loss. Wo found this amounted to124 killed, wounded, and missing, out of 400 men.

Among the killed was Lieutenant C. II. Bradford

On the 13th of April, 1863, Beauregard announcedto the War Department , that he had obtained a key tothe signals, but suspected deception. Major John John-son writes to the editors that advantage, was taken ofthe signals in preparingtoresist the assault on Wagner,July I8tli, and the boat attacks on Cunnning’s Point, and

of the Marines . Lieutenant E. P. Williams, Execu-tive of the Powhatan, a bravo and dashing officer,and Lieutenants B. II. Porter and 8. W. Prestonwere taken prisoners. They were all exchanged,and Porter and Preston were killed in the secondattack on Fort Fisher. Preston, Porter, and For-rest— the last of whom died of yellow fever in theWest Indies —were close friends, and alike in thosequalities that adorn humanity and make heroes ofmen. Lieutenant F. W. Bunce and ])r. Wheeler,both of tho Patapxc.o, in this affair sustained thehigh reputation they had already earned on everyoccasion when the L’atapsoo had been engaged onperilous service. Conspicuous, also, were the serv-ices of Daniel Looch, Acting Paymaster of thePata-pxco, who at tho same time performed theduties of signal officer. There was material in thecommand, both in officers and men, that wouldhave insured success, had this been within therango of human endeavor. Fivo thousand mencould not havo captured the fort that night.

After the war General Beauregard wrote me twolotters on the subject of the attack, in which hesays, in effect: “After the fall of Wagner andGregg, acting under the belief that our forces werethereby demoralized, tho enemy would doubtlessmake a demonstration against Sumter. Our im-pression to this effect was strengthened by thenumber of armed boats seen to bo gathering aroundtho ilag-sliip, from vessels inside and outside, dur-ing September 8th. We were, moreover, able toread all tho signals made that day.& Sumter was

Port Sumter, in September. On tho other hand, GeneralW. B. Taliaferro, who column tided on MorriH Island attlio time of the attack on Battery Wagner referred to byMajor Johnson, states in tho “Philadelphia Times,”November lllh. 1882, that flic Union signals were notinterpreted on that occasion.— Uditoiis.