THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863.

57

cess. On the extreme northern end of Folly Island forty-seven field and siegeSuns and mortars were quietly placed in position, screened by thick under-growth from the view of the enemy on the opposite side of Light-House inlet.They were intended to operate against his batteries there, protect the column°f boats in its advance across the stream, or cover its retreat in case ofre pulse. The entrance to Stono inlet was lighted up at night, and all trans-ports bringing troops were ordered to enter after dark and leave before morn-ln g. All appearance of preparations for offensive operations was carefullyOppressed, while upon General Israel Yogdes’s defensive works on thes °uth end of Folly Island a semblance of activity was conspicuously dis-played. Brigadier-G-eneral A. H. Terry’s division, about 4000 effective, and^rigadier-Gteneral George C. Strong’s brigade, numbering about 2500, werefiuietly added to the Folly Island command under cover of darkness.

The project for securing a lodgment on Morris Island comprised, as one ofh® features, a demonstration in force on James Island by way of StonoRiver, over the same ground where Brigadier-General Benham had met withre pulse the year before. The object in the present case was to prevent theSe uding of reenforcements to the enemy on Morris Island from that quarter,ppJ possibly to draw a portion of the Morris Island garrison in that direction.Everything being in readiness, the character of the assault about to be0, 'dered, the risk involved therein, and the magnitude of the interests ats tnke became for the moment subjects of grave consideration. For if thispssault failed, the promise to demolish Fort Sumter failed also, carrying inlt,s train the failure of the naval project to capture Charleston and inflictbanishment in the place where the rebellion had its birth,,and the furthera uure to destroy this great blockade-running thoroughfare, and to restorep^didence in the efficiency of the iron-clads, upon which special stress had. ee n laid. The storming of a position strongly held by both artillery andgantry, is always an operation attended with imminent peril in its execu-l(>t b and great uncertainty as to results. The best troops can seldom be made0 advance under the fire of even a few well-served pieces of artillery sup-ported by the fire of small-arms. No lesson of our great civil war was learnedY greater cost than this. But the hazard of such an undertaking, great asls under ordinary circumstances where the aggressive force operates on firmP °Und, becomes greatly and painfully intensified when the assaulting columnas to approach in small boats from a distant point, exposed to full view andc °Ustant fire, to disembark and form upon an open beach in the presence offf 1 en euiy covered by parapets, and finally to advance to the attack againstCorQ bined fire of artillery and small-arms. Yet this was the work we had°ut to do, and it was belie ved we had the men to do it.oj , le demonstration up the Stono River was begun in the afternoon of July’by Brigadier-G-eneral Terry, who landed on James Island with about 3800ri ' The effect as subsequently ascertained was to draw a portion of thettemy’g forces from our front on Morris Island.

11 the evening of July 9th a small brigade was silently embarked in row-

It is Understood that General Beauregard denies this.— Q. A. G. But see p. 14 . — Editors.Vor -iV. r,