THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863.

69

ea filading and a cross-fire of artillery and small-arms. All tilings con-sidered, it should be regarded as a very formidable work.

With regard to the character of the Confederate defense, Colonel Alf red°ttian [“ The Military Operations of General Beauregard ”] aptly says: “ It isflatter of history to-day that the defense of Fort Sumter and that of Batterya gner are looked upon as two of the most desperate and glorious achieve-ments of the war. They stand unsurpassed in ancient or modern times.”

ithout altogether adopting the superlative tone of this statement, it maybef°n ceded that the defense of Fort Sumter in 1863, when the garrison burrowedllj the ruins of the work as it rapidly crumbled over them heads, was an °table one. The claim has been made, by those who like to indulge in^°niparisons, that this defense stands in sharp contrast to the apparentlyee ble effort to provision and hold the place in 1861.

Many of the popular fallacies of the day with regard to harbor defensesp e based upon just such operations as those developed in the conflict beforelarleston, and formerly in the “Battle of the Earth-works” on the Crimea ._ defensive strength of Battery Wagner throughout the siege, and thehged strength of Fort Sumter after it had been battered into a shapeless massx ' u bis, are mistakenly cited as evidence that earth-works are better than fortsP brick or stone, and are quite sufficient to meet any expected naval attack,torpedoes it has been claimed that if a very imperfect system, existing largelyWe imagination only, succeeded in keeping a powerful fleet at bay for half aai \ it would be entirely safe to depend on a well-equipped toi’pedo defense forof 6 Protection of our important harbors; and many professional men, mostlynaval tendencies, drawing a comparison between the thin-plated and weaklyiron-clads of 1863 and the powerful men-of-war of more recent type,& upon an armored navy as the only safe means of sea-coast protection,hese points will bear a brief discussion. It will doubtless not be denieda t the requirements of a good defense are determined by the character andgnitude of the attack. If an enemy brings heavy guns against us, we( j^ °f course protect our own guns from heavy shot, or they will bei eS W°y e d- If his vessels are incased in thick armor, we must use heavy pro-f r lies a 8’ a bist it, or our defense is worthless; for where a crushing blow^ a large gun is needed, no possible accumulation of smaller guns willee - Cumulative force implies unity of mass and impact. A thousandn ds of grape-shot, even if fired at short range in one volley, can besh f a 1-bicli steel plate ; but the same weight, sent as a single ball, willthe t6r ^ le b e ‘A 12-inch armor. We must, therefore, have heavy guns, andto W so mounted as to be measurably safe from the enemy’s fire. If

e se conditions we add one more, that the guns shall have time to do theirAv jlj ’"that is, that the hostile fleet cannot run past them at full speed, butha 4 , 6 arres t e d by torpedoes,— we have the whole theory and practice ofIt ° V ^ e ^ ense by fortifications and their auxiliary submarine mines.itself S an enor W su PPO‘ se that a defense by torpedoes, however perfect inProf ’ CaU 8 bind alone. To be of any practical use, the torpedoes must be°ted from removal by the enemy, the only efficient protection yet devised