THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863.

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n eiit risk of destruction. A defease of this potential character is calculated^nite as much to prevent an attack as to defeat it. It is a most powerful con-servator of international quiet and good-will. Indeed, the chief office ofPermanent fortifications is to avert war. They are the guardians, rather^ la, n the champions, of the public good and of the prosperity of the people.

^ confusion of ideas seems to prevail with regard to the appropriate work ofa navy in a scheme of national defense, frequently taking form in the asser-lr> n that an iron-clad navy alone—a navy of cruisers as distinguished from^on-seagoing batteries, rams, and the like—will furnish a sure defense. Thissentiment, although both attractive and popular, finds no practical existenced ttLong naval powers. A home fleet, if as powerful as the enemy’s, would beex Pected to make, and no doubt would make, a good defense. But in that^ as e, at the very best our chances of victory would be only equal to those ofhe enemy, while the risks taken and the consequences to ensue from failure^°Uld be largely unequal. Where interests of great magnitude are at stake,0l Ainary prudence would suggest that as little as possible be left to the capricechance. A trustworthy defense of this character, therefore, implies a harboree t a little more powerful than the enemy’s. It implies, further, that such ae et must be provided for each locality to be protected. Not knowing wherele enemy will strike, we must be prepared for him with a fleet at all impor-ht points. But no antagonist, especially if he be on the defensive, can wiselyf a ce his main reliance upon a weapon which can be as readily procured andas skillfully used by his adversary as by himself. Destructive energy of theSa,|le denomination is neutralized when placed in opposing hands. Fleetgrayed against fleet leaves too much to risk and accident, with our stake on* e issue immeasurably greater than the enemy’s. These maxims unmistak-. y Point to the necessity of depending mainly upon those agencies, exclu-Slv % our own, which cannot be neutralized or duplicated by our antagonist,f lK ' w iU therefore always keep him at disadvantage, to wit: permanent shore-^tteries and their accessory channel torpedoes. Auxiliary rams, torpedo-b ° ats , submarine guns, and other forms of naval power may in great measure® counterbalanced by other’s of like character from beyond the seas. Indeed,naval power possessing sea-going qualities may be neutralized entirely,nr main reliance, after all, must be upon sliore-batteries and channel-pedoes, and the combined strength of these must be as great as if no float-lu § auxiliary aid were employed. Otherwise, when these auxiliaries fail, nonccpiate defense would remain, and the position would be lost.

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THE MARSH BATTERY ARMEO WITH MORTARS, AFTER THE EXPLOSION OF THE SWAMP ANGEL.