252 THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR.

On the historic 4th day of May, 18G4, the Confederate army at my front layat Dalton, Georgia , composed, according to the best authority, of about 45,000men [see also p. 281], commanded by Joseph E. Johnston , who was equal inall the elements of generalship to Lee, and who was under instructions fromthe war powers in Richmond to assume the offensive northward as far asNashville . But he soon discovered that he would have to conduct a defensivecampaign. Coincident with the movement of the Army of the Potomac, asannounced by telegraph, I advanced from our base at Chattanooga with theArmy of the Ohio, 13,559 men; the Army of the Cumberland, 60,773, and theArmy of the Tennessee, 24,465,— grand total, 98,797 men and 254 guns.

I had no purpose to attack Johnston’s position at Dalton in front, butmarched from Chattanooga to feign at his front and to make a lodgment mResaca, eighteen miles to his rear, on “ his line of communication and sup-ply.” The movement was partly, not wholly, successful; but it compelledJohnston to let go Dalton and fight us at Resaca, where, May 13th-16th, <> urloss was 2747 and his 2800. I fought offensively and he defensively, aided byearth parapets. He then fell back to Calhoun, Adairsville, and Cassville, whei’ 6he halted for the battle of the campaign ; but, for reasons given in his memoirshe continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to Allatoona.

Pausing for a few days to repair the railroad without attempting Allatoona, ofwhich I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844,1 resolved to push on towardAtlanta by way of Dallas; Johnston quickly detected this, and forced me tofight him, May 25th-28tli, at New Hope Church, four miles north of Dallas *with losses of 3000 to the Confederates and 2400 to us. The country was ahmost in a state of nature—with few or no roads, nothing that a European couldunderstand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as surely as at Sevastopol .

Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received reeU'forcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 rrieu,and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far fi'oD 1our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn ou uS and destroy us. We were equally confident, and not the least alarmed.then fell back to his position at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his rigid,Kenesaw his center, and Lost Mountain his left. His line of ten miles Wi lStoo long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and concentrated oUKenesaw. We closed down in battle array, repaired the railroad up to outvery camps, and then prepared for the contest. Not a day, not an hour, not»minute was there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute con-tact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in rear of the skirmishers;and tlms matters continued until June 27th, when I ordered a general assault,with the full cooperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, .McPherson, :UI< ISchofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for their country’ 8cause; but we failed, losing 3000 men, to the Confederate loss of 630. Still*the result was that within three days Johnston abandoned the strongest pos-sible position and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River-. We wereon his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the 4th day °:July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee on the 10th, covered ui'd