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account of those affairs, and thereby correct theunintentional mistakes in the meager statementsgiven above.
The winter having ended, and all possible prep-arations having been made, the operations knownas the Dalton-Atlanta campaign opened on May5th, 1804, by the advance of General Thomas onTunnel Hill, and on May 7tli the withdrawal ofour forces within Mill Creek Gap marked the begin-ning of the long retreat. Including the corps ofGeneral Polk, then under orders to join him, Gen-eral Johnston had under his command, available forstrategic purposes, between 65,000 and 70,000men of all arms. It was a superb army of veterans,with implicit confidence in its general, and capableof great achievements. Deficient to a certain ex-tent in supplies, it had enough for any possiblemovement its commander might order. Being aConfederate army, it necessarily was inferior tothe army before it in numbers, equipment, and sup-plies. This was generally the case. It was neces-sarily so. With a white population of 5,000,000to over 20,000,000 ; with no market, no ships, nofactories, no credit; against a people commandingthe sea, rich in all resources, and with all the worldto buy from,—it was the fate of the Southern armiesto confront armies larger, better equipped, and ad-mirably supplied. Unless we could by activity,audacity, aggressiveness, and skill overcome theseadvantages it was a mere matter of time as to thecertain result. It was therefore the first requisiteof a Confederate general that he should be willingto meet his antagonist on these unequal terms, andon such terms make fight. He must of necessitytake great risks and assume grave responsibilities.While these differences between the two armiesthat confronted each other in the mountains ofNorth Georgia existed, they were no greater thanusually existed, and for which every Confederategeneral must be presumed to have prepared. I re-peat, ours was a superb army. While it had metdefeat, and knew what retreat meant, it had foughtbattles which were and are among the bloodiest inall the annals of war ; and it felt that under John-ston it could parallel Cliickamauga and renew theglories of Shiloh.
The army lay behind an impassable ridge, throughwhich, on its left flank, were only tw r o accessiblegaps, — Dug Gap, less than four miles south-westfrom Dalton, on the main road from Dalton to Lafay-ette, and perhaps six miles from Mill Creek Gap;and Snake Creek Gap, some eighteen miles southfrom Mill Creek Gap. [See map, p. 251.] Withthese gaps fortified, the left flank and rear of thatarmy were absolutely safe; for while the ltocky-f acoand Chattooga ridges protected our flank, throughthese gaps we had access to attack the flank of theenemy if he attempted to make a march so far tothe left and rear as to threaten our communicationsouth of the Oostenaula or Coosa. These gaps werecapable of easy and impregnable fortification. DugGap was a mere road cut out of the mountain-sideand really needed no breastworks, for the naturalpalisades and contour of the mountain renderedeasy its defense by resolute men. Snake Creek Gapwas a gorge apparently cut through the mountains
by the creek that ran through it. It was a narrowdefile between Milk Mountain and Horn Mountain*which are merely a prolongation of ChattoogaMountains, and capable of impregnable defense.
These gaps were well known to both armies-Through them ran public roads, and soldiers of botharmies had marched through both. Late in Feb-ruary Dug Gap had been seized by an Indiana regi'ment and held until Cleburne retook it. As earlyas February General Thomas, knowing that at thattime Snake Creek Gap was unguarded, proposed acampaign, the plan being to attract General John-ston’s attention by a demonstration on BuzzardRoost, and to throw the main body of the armythrough Snake Creek Gap, and cut his communi-cations between Dalton and the Oostenaula.
Neither of these gaps was fortified, and on May5th, when the campaign opened, Dug Gap wasguarded by a small command of Arkansas troop 9under Colonel Williamson, numbering perliap 9250, while Snake Creek Gap was left wholly un-protected. At Rosaca, where tire railroad crosse 9the Oostenaula, Cantey’s brigade was held on theevening of the 7tli of May, on its way from Row®to Dalton .
General Sherman had in hand for attack nearly100,000 men and 254 guns, divided into threearmies — the Army of the Cumberland, com-manded by General Thomas, numbering 00,773*the Army of the Tennessee, General McPherson*24,405 ; the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield*13,550. It was a superb army, admirably equip"ped, abundantly supplied, excellently led. It W» 9veteran, and had known victory. It had pushedits antagonist out of Kentucky with the surrenderof Donelson; had captured Tennessee ; capturedVicksburg; repossessed tho Mississippi River *driven its foe over Missionary Ridge in flight. Rknew how to fight, and was willing to fight.
On May 7th our cavalry was driven throughMill Creek Gap. On that night, after we had gou®into camp, Colonel Grigsby, who commanded theKentucky cavalry brigade, was ordered to send aregiment to tho front of Dug Gap, to guard the ap-proaches to it. I 11 obedience to that, order the SR®Kentucky Cavalry passod over Rocky-faco Kidg®’and near midnight bivouacked on Mill Creek*about, a mile from, and in front of, Dug G ft P -Heavy picket linos wero thrown out on all tl>®roads leading down tho valley. Thero wero sev-eral of theso roads, and scouts were sent out t°ascertain the movements of tho enemy. By day"light it was discovered that very largo bodies 0troops wore moving down tho valley on all t® 0roads leading to tho south. General MePhorS 011had marched i 'rum. Chattanooga to lfossvlH®’thence west of Cliickamauga Mountain to Shipp sGap and to Villanow, where tho road forks-— 0,10branch loading down tho east foot of Tayl® r ®Ridge, the other leading across toward Rocky-fi* 0 ® Jthis road again forks — one branch leading throngDug G ap, tho other down the valley to Snako Cre® 'Gap. Until McPherson reached Villanow itonly a conjecture as to his courso, and until t 1head of his column turned toward Snako Ore®
Gap his destination was uncertain. His in®
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