332

THE GEORGIA MILITIA ABOUT ATLANTA.

the States and the general government ot the Con-federacy were then being subjected. It will beseen later, that when General Johnston’s armyapproached still closer to Atlanta , Governor Browncalled into active service the old men of the Stateup to the age of fifty-five, and the boys down tosixteen years, armed in great part with flint-lockmuskets, ordinary rifles, and shot-guns, and or-dered them to report to me for service in the field.

Immediately after the two classes of State of-ficers were organized, the Governor tendered theirservices to General Johnston, reserving the right,however, to withdraw them from the Confederateservice whenever the interests of the State shouldrequire it. Their services were accepted on theseterms, and General Wayne was ordered to reportto General Johnston. The latter directed thelarger portion of General Wayne’s command toguard the crossings of the Chattahoochee ltiverfrom Roswell to West Point, the distance beingnearly one hundred miles. About one thousandmen were left in camp of instruction near Atlanta .

A short time after, in order that General Waynemight resume his duties as Adjutant-General ofthe State, much to my surprise the troops electedme to command them in the field. At that timeI was busily engaged in Macon , preparing for themanufacture of iron, the iron-works at Etowah, innorth Georgia , under my charge, having been de-stroyed by General Sherman’s army a few weeksbefore.

I took command of the Georgia militia on the 1stof June, and began to prepare them for the field.About the middle of June General Mansfield Lovellcame from Marietta to explain to me the conditionof affairs near that place and General Johnston’sviews in reference to the special service it was pro-posed should bo performed by that portion of mycommand which was in camp of instruction. Itseemed that whilst Johnston’s army was stronglyintrenched and capable of resisting direct attack,his lines were already so extended that no troopscould safely be taken from the trenches to supportthe cavalry on the flanks. But it was believed byGeneral Johnston that if the small cavalry force onhis left could be supported by the militia, the ex-tension of Sherman’s army on that side might, bechecked, and the Confederates could permanentlyhold position near Marietta. I told General Lovellthat I did not believe the small available forceof raw militia, acting as a support to the cavalry,could stop Sherman’s advance if ho chose to movein force around Johnston’s left flank ; but if I re-ceived a positive order from General Johnston tomove across the Chattahoochee for the purpose in-dicated, the order would be obeyed to the bestof my ability, without regard to my opinion of thematter. In giving that order, General Lovell, inthe name of General Johnston, directed mo not toallow my command to become closely engaged withsuperior numbers.

Fortunately for this small body of militia, therewas then in Atlanta a Confederate battery of lightpieces, commanded by Captain K. W. Anderson.That battery had just been refitted for field service,and was awaiting orders to return to the front.

Without other authority than my own, but withthe full consent of the officers and men, I tookthis battery with tho militia when we crossed theChattahoochee at James’s Ferry, and assumedposition in the open country, within close support-ing distance of our small force of cavalry, five orsix miles from the left of General Johnston’sintrenched position.

We played “brag” with the Federals in theopen country, on that side, for eight or ten days*giving way a little when they pressed, but stillholding position well out until they advanced inearnest on tho 3d of July, when it became appar-ent that they were moving close on us in largoforce. Against this advance our cavalry could dobut little more than “ got out of the way.”

For a short time thereafter the “supportingforce ” was at a great disadvantage, but it waswithdrawn in good order, and the line of cavalrypickets was again formed between tho militia andthe advancing Federal columns.

On the 4tli, being farther pressed, the wholoforce was moved back to tho crest of Nickajaekridge, about throe miles north of Turner’s Ferry.At the point whero the road from that ferry crossesthe ridge air embrasure battery for artillery hadbeen previously constructed, and short lines oltrenches for infantry extended on each side, bid'not far enough to givo cover to more than fi v °hundred men. In a very short time after thetroops were formed in this defensive position, theFederals, in largo force, advanced against outfront.

J!

Tho situation of the militia on the aftornoon <"t.lio 4th will bo bettor understood by reference j°the movements that had been previously made i"other portions of the theater of operations. Juty1 st, General Sherman roportod to General Hailed* •“ Schofield is now south of Olley’s Creek. . • '

To-morrow night I propose to move MePhors"Ufrom the left to tho extreme right. . . . T' l<1

movement is substantially . . . straight 1°*

Atlanta .” Ono of McPherson’s divisions move 1

on tho 2d, the rest, of his army followed that night.

and on tho 4tli the armies of Schofield u" (McPherson woro concentrated in front of themilitia, four or livo miles west and a little southof the position then occupied by General Johnston *•army strongly intrenched at Smyrna Station,or eight miles south of Marietta.

Tho affair at Smyrna Station, that day, is J ' l “ported by General Sherman as follows :

“ Wo celebrate our 4Mi or July by a nolNy but not dc rt 'perato battle, to hold Die enemy there till Goner 1 'McPherson and Schellcld can get. well into posit'"'below him, near the Chat.tahooe.heo crossings.”

When I took up a. defensive position on tho eredof Nickttjack ridge I did not know that the arnn".of McPherson and Schofield wero in, my immedhd 0front, but it was evident that the Federal ford 'pressing upon tho militia woro in largo numb" 1 '’"'ami if they passed us they would he within cimAroach of the then unoccupied strong Oonfoder"'fortifications on tlio north lunik of tho Ohatf 1 ^hooohoo ltiver. Those works had been construct"'some time before, under tho supervision of 11,1