34i
coming in contact with different lines of intrench-Dients, several of ■which they had carried and held.Pearing a concentration of the enemy upon Hardee,I commanded General Cheatham, about 3 P. M., tomove forward with his corps and attack the posi-tion in hi s front, so as to, at least, create a diver-sion. The order was promptly and well executed,a nd our troops succeeded in taking possession ofthe enemy’s defenses in that part of the field.
heavy enfilade fire, however, forced Cheathamto abandon the works lie had captured.
Major-General G. W. Smith, perceiving thatCheatham had moved out on his left, and havingthoroughly comprehended all the orders relativeto tiie battle, moved gallantly forward with hisState troops in support of Cheatham’s attack, but"'as eventually forced to retire on account of su-periority of numbers in his front.
Hardee bore off as trophies eight guns and thir-teen stand of colors, and, having rectified his line,"einained in the presence of the enemy. Cheathamcaptured five guns and five or six stand of colors.
Notwithstanding the non-fulfillment of the brill-iant result anticipated, the partial success of that!% was productive of much benefit to the army,tt greatly improved the morale of the troops, bi-ased new life and fresh hopes, arrested deser-H°ns, which had hitherto been numerous, defeatedPe movement of McPherson and Schofield upon° Ur communications in that direction, and demon-strated to the foe our determination to abandon
Wore territory without at least a manful effort
ho __
to retain it,
It became apparent almost immediately after thecattle of the 22d that Sherman would make an at-a °k upon our left, in order to destroy the Macon la -ilroad; and, from that moment, I may say, be-£an the siege of Atlanta . The battles of the 20thail d 2 2d checked the enemy’s reckless manner ofSieving, and illustrated effectually to Sherman thea nger of stretching out his line in such a manneras to form extensive gaps between his corps orart nies as lie admits he did at Rocky Pace Ridgeand New Hope Church.
On the 2Gth of July the Federal® were reported0 he moving to our left. This movement con-blued during the 27tli, when I received the ad-itional information that their cavalry was turningChr right, in the direction of Plat ltock, with thejhtention, as I supposed, of interrupting our mainj 'e of communication, the Macon railroad. Wela d lost the road to Augusta previous to the de-parture of General Johnston on the J. 8th, and, byle 22d, thirty miles or more thereof had beenutterly destroyed.
kb - ^' edeTa I commander continued to move by^ s right flank to our left, liis evident intentionsni^ destr °y Hie only line by which we wereable to receive supplies. The railroad totah^ because of its proximity to the Chat-
V'hooehee Rive,., was within easy reach of theto * 1 °^ "I lenev er he moved far enough to the rightaft aC6 5lis u P on the river. Therefore,
holm instruction of the Augusta road, thetu '+ U ^ Atlanta — unless some favorable oppor-tbty offered itself to defeat the Pederals in
battle — depended upon our ability to hold intactthe road to Macon .
General Wheeler started on the 27th of July inpursuit of the Federal cavalry which had movedaround our right; and General [W. H.] Jackson,with the brigades of [Thomas] Harrison and [L.S.] Ross, was ordered, the following day, to pushvigorously another body of the enemy’s cavalrywhich was reported to have crossed tlie river,at Campbellton, and to be moving, via Fairburn,in the direction of the Macon road. On the 28thit was apparent that Sherman was also movingin the same direction with Ms main body. Lieu-tenant-General S. D. Lee was instructed to moveout with liis corps upon the Lick-Skillet road,and to take the position most advantageous toprevent or delay the extension of the enemy’sright flank. This officer promptly obeyed orders,and in the afternoon, unexpectedly, came in con-tact with the Pederals in the vicinity of EzraChurch, where a spirited engagement ensued. Theenemy was already in possession of a portion ofthe ground Lee desired to occupy, and the strugglegrew to such dimensions that I sent Lieutenant-General Stewart to his support. The contest lastedtill near sunset without any material advantagehaving been gained by either opponent. Ourtroops failed to dislodge the enemy from theirposition, and the Pederals likewise to capture theposition occupied by the Confederates.
Whilst these operations were in progress, Wheelerand Jackson were in hot pursuit of the Federalcavalry; General Lewis’s infantry brigade havingbeen sent to Jonesboro ’, the point about which Isupposed the raiders would strike our communica-tions.
At an early hour on the 29th dispatches werereceived from various points upon the Macon roadto the effect that General Wheeler had success-fully checked the enemy at Latimer’s, and wasquietly awaiting developments. On our left, thePederals succeeded in eluding our cavalry, for atime, by skirmishing with our main body, whilsttheir main force moved round to the rear and cutthe telegraph lines at Fairburn and Palmetto.General Jackson, however, soon discovered theruse, and marched rapidly toward Fayetteville andJonesboro ’, the direction in which the Pederalshad moved. The enemy succeeded in destroyinga wagon-train at the former' place, in capturingone or two quartermasters who afterward madetheir escape, and in striking the Macon road aboutfour miles below Jonesboro ’, when the work ofdestruction was begun in earnest.
General Lewis, within three hours after receivingthe order, had placed his men on the cars and wasin Jonesboro ’ with liis brigade ready for action.Meantime Jackson was coming up with his cavalry,when the Pederals became alarmed and aban-doned their work, but not without having de-stroyed about a mile and a half of the road,which was promptly repaired.
While Jackson followed in pursuit and Lewisreturned to Atlanta , Wheeler moved across fromLatimer’s, with a portion of his command, iu rearof this body of the enemy, leaving General Iverson