350
THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN.
made. J His forces consisted of Emory’s division, and Grover’s two brigadesof the Nineteenth Corps, about 10,500 strong, Cameron’s and Ransom’sdivisions of the Thirteenth Corps, about 4800, and the newly organizeddivision of cavalry and newly mounted infantry, under Brigadier-GeneralAlbert L. Lee, numbering 4600. Bad weather had ruined the roads; but onthe 13th of March Lee led the advance of the column from Franklin, on theTeche, and, moving by Opelousas and Bayou Boeuf, marched into Alexandria,distant 175 miles, on the 19th, followed by the infantry and artillery on the25th and 26th.
Banks himself made his headquarters at Alexandria on the 24th, and thereon the 27th he received fresh orders that imposed a new and well-nigh impos-sible condition on the campaign. These were the instructions of Lieutenant-General Grant, dated the 15tli of March, on taking command of the army ofthe United States , looking to the cooperation of the whole effective force ofor in the Department of the Gulf in the combined movement early in May ofall the armies between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. A. J. Smith was tojoin the Army of the Tennessee for the Atlanta campaign, and Banks was togo against Mobile. If Shreveport were not to be taken by the 25th of April, atlatest, then A. J. Smith’s corps was to be returned to Vicksburg by the 10th,“ even if it should lead to the abandonment of the expedition.” Yet Iialleck’sorders for the expedition were not revoked; it was to go on — only, to makesure that it should not be gone too long, it was put in irons. Banks mightwell have given up the campaign then and there; yet there was a chancethat Kirby Smith might not be able to concentrate in time to save Shreve-port ; another, still more remote, that he might give the place up without afight, and a third, more unlikely than either, that Steele might join Banks in time to make short work of it. There were twenty-six days left beforethe latest time at which A. J. Smith must leave him ; so in his dilemma Banks decided to take these chances.
His delay made no real difference, for the river, though slowly rising, wasstill so low that the gun-boats had not been able to pass the difficult rapidsthat obstruct the navigation just above Alexandria. The leading gun-boat,JKastport, hung nearly three days on the rocks; the hospital steamer, Woodfordfollowing her, was wrecked, and it was not until the 3d of April that the lastof the thirteen gun-boats j and thirty transports that were finally taken abovethe rapids had succeeded in making the difficult passage. Seven gun-boatsand the larger transports staid below; the only communication with theupper fleet was by the road around the falls; all supplies had therefore tobe landed, hauled round in wagons, and reshipped; and this made it neces-sary to establish depots and to leave Grover’s division, four thousand strong?at Alexandria for the protection of the storos and the carry. At the san> atime General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, recalled Ellet’S
) The following summer, oven after the ltodltiver failure, General Grant considered that hewould be strengthened by having Franklin tocommand the right wing of his army [see p.100].— R. B. I.