THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE.

43 1

messenger to General Cheatham to lose no time ingaining possession of the pike at Spring Hill. ItWas reported hack that he was about to do so. -fo

Listening attentively to the fire of the skir-mishers in that direction I discovered there washo continued roar of musketry, and being aware°f the quick approach of darkness, about 4 o’clockat that season of the year, I became somewhatuneasy, and again oi’dered an officer to go to Gen-e ral Cheatham, inform him that his supports werevery near at hand ; that he must attack at once, ifLe had not already so done, and take and hold pos-session of the pike. Shortly afterward I intrustedanother officer with the same message, and, if mymemory is not treacherous, finally requested thegovei-nor of Tennessee, Isham G. Harris , to hastenforward and impress upon Cheatham the impor-tance of action without delay. I knew no largeforce of the enemy could be at Spring Hill, ase ouriers reported Schofield’s main body still infront of Lee, at Columbia, up to a late hour in the4ay. I thought it probable that Cheatham hadtaken possession of Spring Hill without encounter-ln g material opposition, or had formed line acrossthe pike, north of the town, and intrenched with-out coming in serious contact with the enemy,yhich would account for the little musketry heard*n his direction. However, to ascertain the truth,I sent an officer to ask Cheatham if he held thePike, and to inform him of the arrival of Stewart,Whose corps I intended to throw on his left, inorder to assail the Federals in flank that evening0r the next morning, as they approached andformed to attack Cheatham. At this juncture thelast messenger returned witli the report that ther °ad had not been taken possession of. GeneralStewart was then ordered to proceed to the right°f Cheatham and place his corps across the pike1101 'th of Spring Hill.

Ly this hour, however, twilight was upon us,When General Cheatham rode up in person. I atonce directed Stewart to halt, and, turning toCheatham, I exclaimed with deep emotion, as I feltfr' e golden opportunity fast slipping from me,

General, why in the name of God have you notAttacked the enemy and taken possession of thatpike H e replied that the line looked a little tooong for him, and that Stewart should first form onhis right, j I could hardly believe it possible thathis brave old soldier, who had given proof of suchCourage and ability upon so many hard-foughthelds, would even make such a report. After lead-l ng him within full view of the enemy, and pointing

“ General Hood conveniently forgot to mention, in8 account of this affair, the taels as to his orders toie at Rutherford's Creek. [See p. 438.] And lie also for-f ’hat:, at tlie very moment lie claims to have sent-Jff-omcers to the rear with orders to Stewart andh’^ou to make all possible haste, Stewart was forminglni ® a of battle on the south side of Rutherford’s Creek, inthat Ua, ' 0C °f 'h'dcrs from him; nor did lie rememberhb S,;<: 'vnrt’s corps was not ordered forward untilhut dusk.”— Gemoual Ciieatiiam, in the “ Bivouac.”t„p ‘ffhre, again, General Hood’s memory provedbaa"!. ,OUfi ' M to the preliminary statements of this438 i asi ' ap h> f refer to that portion of my account [see p.,, ^ which covers the doings of the hours from 4 to 0•> during most of which time General Hood was on

out to him the Federals retreating in great hasteand confusion along the pike, and then givingexplicit orders to attack, I would as soon have ex-pected midday to turn into darkness as for himto have disobeyed my orders. I then asked Gen-eral Cheatham whether or not Stewart’s corps, ifformed on the right, would extend across the pike.He answered in the affirmative. Guides were atonce furnished to point out Cheatham’s right toGeneral Stewart, who was ordered to form thereon,with liis right extending across the pike. Dark-ness, however, which was increased by large shade-trees in that vicinity, soon closed upon us, andStewart's corps, after much annoyance, went intobivouac for the night, near, but not across, the pike,at about 11 or 12 o’clock.

It was reported to me about this hour that theenemy was marching along the road, almost underthe light of the camp-fires of the main body of thearmy. I sent anew to General Cheatham to knowif at least a line of skirmishers eonld not be ad-vanced, in order to throw the Federals in confu-sion, to delay their march, and allow us a chanceto attack in the morning. Nothing was done. TheFederals, with immense wagon-trains, were per-mitted to march by us the remainder of the night,within gunshot of our lines. I could not succeedin arousing the troops to action, when one gooddivision would have sufficed to do the work. Onegood division, I reassert, eonld have routed that por-tion of the enemy which was at Spring Hill; couldhave taken possession of and formed line across theroad; and thus could have made it an easy matter toStewart’s corps, Johnson’s division, and Lee’s twodivisions, from Columbia, to have enveloped, routed,and captured Schofield’s army that afternoon andthe ensuing day. General Forrest gallantly op-posed the enemy farther down to our right to thefull extent of his power; beyond this effort noth-ing whatever was done, although never was agrander opportunity offered to utterly rout and de-stroy the Federal army. Had I dreamed for onemoment that Cheatham would have failed to givebattle, or at least to take position across the pikeand force the enemy to assault him, I would my-self have l’idden to the front and led the troopsinto action.

In connection with this grave misfortune, I musthere record an aet of candor and nobility upon thepart of General Cheatham, which proves him to beequally generous-hearted and brave. I was, neces-sarily, much pained by the disappointment suf-fered, and, a few days later, telegraphed to Rich-

tlie ground and in frequent personal communicationwith me. The dramatic scene with which lie embellisheshis narrative of five day’s operations only occurred inthe imagination of General Hood.”— Genebal Cheat-ham, in the “ Bivouac.”

% “ The next order, in the .shape of a suggestion thatI had better have my pickets lire upon stragglingtroops passing along the pike in front of my left, wasreceived and was immediately communicated to Gen-eral Johnson, whose division was on my left and near-est the pike. This note from Major Mason, receivedabout midnight, was the only communication I hadfrom General Hood after leaving him at liis quartersat, Captain Thompson's.”— Gesehal Cheatham, in the“ Bivouac.”