THE DEATH OF GENERALS CLEBURNE AND ADAMS.
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Major-General [Edward] Johnson, whose divisiontad marched in rear of Stewart’s corps, to reportto me. I directed Major Bostick, of my staff, toplace Johnson on my extreme left. About mid-night Major Bostick returned and reported that hetad been near to the turnpike, and could hearstraggling troops passing northward. While heWas talking about this to Colonel Porter, my ehief-of-staii, a courier from headquarters brought anote from Major [A. P.] Mason [Assistant-Adju-tant General], to the effect that General Hoodhad just learned that stragglers were passingalong the road in front of my left, and “ the com-manding general says you had better order yourpicket line to fire on them.” Upon reading thenote I ordered Major Bostick to return to Gen-er al Johnson, whose command was on my leftand nearest the pike, and say to him that he musttake a brigade, or, if necessary, his whole division,and go on to the pike and cut off anything thatmight be passing. Major Bostick afterward in-formed me that General Johnson commenced com-plaining bitterly at having been “ loaned out,” andasked why General Cheatham did not order one oftas own divisions to go in ; but at length ordered hishorse and rode with Major Bostick close up to theturnpike, where they found everything quiet andho one passing. General Johnson came with Major"ostick to my quarters, and informed me of what
they had done. It was now about 2 o’clock on themorning of the 30th.
This suggestion that I had better order mypickets to fire upon stragglers passing in front ofmy left was the only order, if that can be called anorder, that I received from General Hood afterleaving him at his quarters early in the night,when he had informed me of his determination towait until daylight to attack the enemy. Whatreason General Stewart gave for not reachingthe turnpike I do not know. As I have alreadystated, General Hood said to me repeatedly, whenI met him between 4 and 6 o’clock in the after-noon, “.Stewart will be here in a few minutes.”Stewart’s column did not come up until aboutdark.
General Stewart says he w 7 as at Rutherford’sCreek before General Brown’s division crossed thatstream. He also says that General Hood thereordered him to form line of battle on the southside of the creek, and that he was not allowed tomove thence until dusk. If General Stewart hadfollowed Brown he would have been in position onmy right, across the turnpike, before dark. Thathe would have executed an order to make such dis-position of his command, no one who knows thatofficer will doubt; and he would have done itin the darkness of midnight as surely and as cer-tainly as in the day.
THE HEATH OF GENERALS CLEBURNE AND ADAMS.
Jkthe “Bivouac” for October, 1885, James Barr,of Company E, G5th Illinois Volunteers, writ-from Barwell, Kansas , said :
.. ‘ 1 was somewhat interested in that terrible affair atf r anltliii. I was a prisoner near t-lio cotton-gin for' 3 °ut three or four minutes, was ordered to the rear by(> *he of the Confederates, and would have had a trip toll< krsonville had it not been for that ‘ devil-may-care ’°hnter-charge made by Illinoisans and Kentuckians .th* 1 ' .9°* on< d Stewart (65th Illinois ) tried hard to savee life of General John Adams, of Mississippi . Colonel■\ V rnVill ‘t called to our men not to lire on him, hut ittlrf *‘°° k 1 * 0, Adams rode ins horse over the ditch toof the parapet, undertook to grasp the ‘oldfelf' 1 ' Voiu the hands of our color-sergeant, when heu \'horse and all, shot by the color-guard.
Se t Was a reenlistcd veteran, and went through twenty-°h general engagements, but I am sure that Franklinthe hardest-fought iield that I ever stood upon.eiu* l0lal ,T * ^ ox his‘ Franklin and Nashville ’] cen-tio^t ^ ( ‘ 1101 ‘ al Wagner for holding to his advanced posi-es o t °° loi, £» c; d l8 his action a gross blunder, etc.; but,l ei Cox’s men, I looked upon the matter in a dif-
her ,:u + hght. I think if Cleburne had not struck Wag-h ;iv S two brigades as he did that, his brave lads wouldbroken our line successfully; but, as it was, liisVv hi , 1 Wore badly winded with his work with Wagner,to * ave Opdycke’s and White’s men a better chanceI wi^^ ^ Ul at the cotton-gin. The way I saw it was this:of +i acf hig as orderly and standing a few paces eastcanj* 6 . c °tton-gin. The first Confederate troops thatc henn n VioAV werc Stewart’s corps on our left withate b llam ’ s corps to the left of Stewart. The Confoder-he moved easily and steadily on, until Cleburne
was checked for the time by Wagner. The Short timelost by Cleburne threw Stewart’s line too far in ad-vance. Stewart was first to receive the fire from ourmain line, and was unable to carry our works, his menwho were not killed or wounded being compelled to re-tire. Now Cleburne, who had been delayed by Wagner,came up just in time to receive a heavy right obliquefire from the men who had repulsed Stewart’s corps. Inever saw men put in such a terrible position as Cle-burne’s division was in for a few minutes. The wonderis that any of them escaped death or capture.”
In the “Bivouac” for November, 1885, JohnMcQuaide, of Vicksburg , Miss., wrote :
“Some time since I called attention to the inaccura-cies of current history in regard to the manner of Gen-eral Patrick Cleburne ’s death at Franklin. The subjecthas been brought to my mind again by Mr. James Barr’sletter. It has been stated that Cleburne and horse werekilled on top of the works, which is incorrect. It wasGeneral John Adams , of Boring’s division, Stewart’scorps . Early next morning I assisted in putting hisbody in an ambulance; also the body of General Cle-burne. Adams ’s horse was a bay. It was dead upon theworks, with its front legs toward the inner side of theworks. Adams ’s body was lying outside, at the base ofthe works, when I helped to pick it up. Cleburne’s bodywas not less than fifty or sixty yards from the works,and on nearly a straight lino from where Adams fell.This may appear strange, as the two generals be-longed to different divisions and different corps; butthere were repeated charges made upon the works.When one command was repulsed another would bethrown forward.”
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