544
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE AT PETERSBURG.
tions to the new line of defenses selected by me,as already explained, had so much surprised theassaulting columns as to induce their immediatecommanders to additional prudence in their ad-vance and to a complete halt in their operations.
On that morning the troops arrayed against usconsisted of Hancock’s, Burnside’s, and Warren’scorps, with the larger portion of Smith’s underGeneral Martindale, and finally Neill’s divisionfrom Wright’s corps (the Sixth), strengthenedby its whole artillery. This gave the enemy anaggregate of over 90,000 effectives. We had onour side, after Kershaw’s arrival, but 15,000men, no deduction being made for the casualtiesof the three preceding days. It was only later on,somewhere between 12 M. and 1 p. m., that Field’scommand was put in position on the line, andfrom that moment to the end of the day our grandtotal amounted to about 20,000 men. At noon—or thereabout — the predetermined “ grand attack”was renewed, although partial disconnected as-saults had been made before that hour on severalparts of our line, but with no tangible result ofany kind. This renewed attack was mainlyled by Gibbon’s division of Hancock’s corps. Itproved to be entirely ineffectual. And stillanother grand attempt was made at 4 P. M., withat least three full Federal corps cooperating:Hancock’s on the right, Burnside’s in the center,and Warren’s on the left. General Meade , in hisreport, says it was “without success.” And headds these words : “Later in the day attacks weremade by the Fifth and Ninth corps with no betterresults.” The truth is that, despite the over-whelming odds against us, every Federal assault,on the 18th, was met with most signal defeat,“attended,” says Mr. Swinton, the Federal histo-rian, “with another mournful loss of life.” Thiswas, in fact, very heavy, and exceeded ours in theproportion of nine to one. ■&
My welcome to General Lee was most cordial.He was at last where I had, for the past threedays, so anxiously hoped to see him — within thelimits of Petersburg! Two of Ms divisions had pre-ceded him there, and his whole army would be inby evening of the next day, namely, the 19th ofJune. I felt sure, therefore, that, for the presentat least, Petersburg and Richmond were safe. Notthat our forces would be numerically equal tothose of the enemy, even after the arrival of thelast regiment of the Army of Northern Virginia;but I was aware that our defensive line would nowcount more than one man per every four and a halfyards of its length; and I felt relieved to knowthat, at last, the whole of our line—not portionsof it only, as heretofore — would be guarded byveteran troops, alike, if not superior, in mettle tothe veteran troops opposing them.
Scarcely two hours after General Lee ’s arrivalI rode with him to what was known as the CityReservoir, on a commanding elevation, toward theright of our line. A good view of the surroundingcountry could be had from this point, and the
whole field was there spread out before us like amap. I explained to General Lee and showed himthe relative positions of our troops and of those ofthe enemy. I also pointed out to him the new andshorter line then occupied by us, and gave my rea-sons for its location there. They were these :
"First That it kept the enemy’s batteries at a greaterdistance from the besieged town.
“ Second. That it would act as a covered way (as thephrase is in the regular fortifications) should we deemit advisable to construct better works on the higherground in the rear. In the meantime we could constructa series of batteries to protect our front line by Hankingand over-shooting tires ; and we could throw up infantryparapets for our reserves, whenever we should haveadditional troops.
“ Third. That the new line gave a close infantry andartillery fire on the reverse slope of Taylor's Creek andravine, which would prevent the construction of boyauxof approaches and parallels for a regular attack.”
General Lee , whose capacity as a military engi-neer was universally acknowledged,— and noneappreciated it more than I did,— was entirely ofmy opinion. Thus the new defensive line selectedby me, which my own troops had been holding fortwelve hours before the arrival of General Lee atPetersburg, and which his troops occupied as theycame in, was maintained unchanged as to loca-tion— though much strengthened and improvedthereafter — until the end of the war.
After those explanations to General Leo, andwhile still examining the field, 1 proposed to himthat, as soon as Hill’s and Anderson’s corps shouldarrive, our entire disposable force be thrown uponthe left and rear of the Federal army before itbegan to fortify its position. General Lee , aftersome hesitation, pronounced himself against thisplan. He thought it was wiser, under the circum-stances, to allow some rest to his troops (thosepresent as well as those still coming up) after thelong march all would have gone through with; andhe stated as a further reason for his objection, thatour best policy — one, he said, which had thus farproved successful to him — would bo to maintainthe defensive as heretofore. I urged that the Fed-eral troops were at least as much exhausted asours, and that their ignorance of the locality wouldgive us a marked advantage over them; that theirspirits were jaded, and ours brightened just thenby the fact of the junction of his army with myforces ; and that the enemy was not yet intrenched.But I was then only second in command, and myviews did not prevail.
The evening of the 18tli was quiet. There wasno further attempt on the part of General M'oadoto assault our lines. Ho was “satisfied,” as liesaid in his report, that there was “ nothing more tobe gained by direct attacks.” The spade took theplace of the musket, and the regular siego wasbegun. It was only raised April 2, 1805.
No event of our war was more remarkable thanthe almost incredible resistance of the men whoserved under me at Petersburg, on the 15tli, 1 Oth,17th, and 18th of June, before the arrival of Lee .
General Humphreys, in his “Virginia Campaign, 1804 and 1805 ,” places the Union losses from the 15 tli tothe 18th of June at 9904 killed, wounded, and missing. —Editous.