642
THE DEFENSE OF FORT FISHER.
in command of the fact, and at the same time toldhim that the safety of the place depended on theAlbemarle, and the safety of the Albemarle dependedon the watchfulness of his pickets.
The crew of the Albemarle numbered but sixty,too small a force to allow me to keep an armedwatch on deck at night and to do outside picketingbesides. Moreover, to break the monotony of thelife and keep down ague, I had always out an ex-pedition of ten men, who were uniformly success-ful in doing a fair amount of damage to the enemy.
The officer in command of the troops was inclinedto give me all assistance, and sent a picket oftwenty-five men under a lieutenant; they werefurnished with rockets and had a field-piece. Thispicket was stationed on board of a schooner aboutgun-shot below the Albemarle, where an attemptwas being made to raise a vessel (the Southfield)sunk at the time of Commander Cooke’s dash downthe river. Yet on the night of the 27th of OctoberCushing’s steam-launch ran alongside the schoonerunobserved by the picket, without a sound or sig-nal, and then steamed up to the Albemarle.
It was about 3 A. M. The night was dark andslightly rainy, and the launch was close to us whenwe hailed and the alarm was given — so close thatthe gun could not be depressed enough to reach her;so the crew were sent in the shield with muskets,and kept up a heavy fire on the launch as she slowlyforced her way over the chain of logs and ranged byus within a few feet. As she reached the bow of theAlbemarle I heard a report as of an unshotted gun,and a piece of wood fell at my feet. Calling the car-penter, I told him a torpedo had been exploded, andordered him to examine and report to me, sayingnothing to any one else. He soon reported “ a hole
in her bottom big enough to drive a wagon in.” Bythis time I heard voices from the launch: “Wesurrender,” etc., etc., etc. I stopped our fire andsent out Mr. Long, who brought back all those whohad been in the launch except the gallant captainand three of her crew, all of whom took to thewater. Having seen to their safety, I turned myattention to the Albemarle and found her restingon the bottom in eight feet of water, her upperworks above water.
That is the -way the Albemarle was destroyed,and a more gallant thing was not done during thewar. After her destruction, failing to convincethe officer in command of the troops that he couldnot hold the place, I did my best to help defend it.Half of my crew went down and obstructed theriver by sinking the schooner at the wreck, andwith the other half I had two 8-inch guns com-manding the upper river put into serviceable order,relaid platforms, fished out tackles from the Albe-marle, got a few shells, etc., and waited. I did nothave to wait long. The fleet steamed up to the ob-structions, fired a few shells over the town, steameddown again, and early next morning rounding theisland were in the river and opened fire.
The two 8-ineh guns worked by Mr. Long andMr. Shelley did their duty, and I think did all thatwas done in the defense of Plymouth. The fire ofthe fleet was concentrated on us, and one at.leastof the steamers was so near that I could hear theorders given to elevate or depress the guns. WhenI felt that by hanging on I could only sacrifice mymen and achieve nothing, I ordered our guns spikedand the men sent round to the road by a ravine. Thecrew left me by Captain Maffitt were good and truemen, and stuck by me to the last.
THE DEFENSE OF FORT FISHER.
BY ITS COMMANDER, WILLIAM LAMB, COLONEL, C. S. A.
T he capture of Fort Fisher, N. C. , on the 15thof January, 1865, was followed so quick-ly by the final dissolution of the Southern Con-federacy that the great victory was not fullyrealized by the American people. The positioncommanded the last gateway between the Confed-erate States and the outside world. [See outlinemap, p. 629; also map, p. 694.] Its capture,with the resulting loss of all the Cape Fear River defenses, and of Wilmington , the great importingdepot of the South, effectually ended all blockade-running. Lee sent me word that Fort Fisher mustbe held, or he could not subsist his army.
The indentation of the Atlantic Ocean in theCarolina coast known as Onslow Bay and the CapeFear River running south from Wilmington formthe peninsula known as Federal Point, which, dur-ing the civil war, was called Confederate Point.Not quite seven miles north of the end of this pen-insula stood a high sand-hill called the “SugarLoaf.” Here there was an intrenched camp for theArmy of Wilmington, under General Braxton Bragg ,the department commander , that was hid from thesea by forest and sand-hills. From this intrenchedcamp the river bank, with a neighboring ridge
of sand-dunes, formed a covered way for troopsto within a hundred yards of the left salient ofFort Fisher. Between this road and the oceanbeach was an arm of Masonboro’ Sound, and whereit ended, three miles north of the fort, were occa-sional fresh-water swamps, generally wooded withscrub growth, and in many places quite impassable.Along the ocean shore was an occasional batteryformed from a natural sand-hill, behind whichWhitworth guns were carried from the fort tocover belated blockade-runners, or to protect moreunfortunate ones that had been chased ashore.About half a mile north of the fort there was arise in the plain forming a hill some twenty feetabove the tide on the river side, and on this was aredoubt commanding the approach to the fort bythe river road. Thus Nature, assisted by someslight engineering work, had given a defense toConfederate Point which would have enabled anefficient commander at the intrenched camp, co-operating with the garrison of Fort Fisher, to haverendered the Point untenable for a largely superiorforce at night when the covering fire of the Federalnavy could not distinguish between friend and foe.[See General Bragg ’s statement, note, p. 654.]