654

THE DEFENSE OF FORT FISHER.

resistance ; and I assured him that if Bragg wouldeven then attack, a fresh "brigade landed at Bat-tery Buchanan could retake the work. Some offi-cer suggested that the general should take me withhim, as I was probably fatally wounded, but I re-fused to leave, wishing to share the fate of mygarrison ; and desiring that my family, anxiouslyawaiting tidings across the river, where they had

COI.OHEL LOUIS BELL . FROM A FHOTOGEAPH.

watched the battle, should not be alarmed, I spokelightly of my wound. I asked him to carry Gen-eral Whiting to a place of safety, as he had cometo the fort a volunteer. Just then the approachof the enemy was reported, and Colquitt made aprecipitate retreat, leaving Whiting behind. &

One more distressing scene remains to be chroni-

% General Whiting died a prisoner at Fort Columbus,New York Harbor, March 10th, 1865.

4- In Vol. X., ii. 316, of the “ Southern HistoricalSociety Papers ” may he found a letter from GeneralBraxton Bragg to his brother, dated Wilmington , fivedays after the fall of Fort Fisher (first published in 1881);also an article by Colonel Lamb, controverting most ofGeneral Bragg’s statements. Genera] Bragg says (moreemphatically but substantially as in his official report);

“ Two hours before hearing of the certain fall of the fort, Ifelt as confident as ever man did of successfully defendingit. . . . No human power could have prevented the enemyfrom landing, covered as he was by a fleet of ships carrying600 heavy guns. Anywhere beyond the range of our heavyguns on the fort our land force could not approach liim. Oncelanded, our only chance was to keep him, if possible, fromthe fort. With less than half his numbers, had we extendedfar enough toward the fort to prevent his movement thatway lie could have crossed the narrow peninsula north of usand cut us off entirely, when the fort and all must havegone.”

General Bragg , after explaining that his cavalry pick-ets failed to report tile movement by night of Terry’sforce to its intrenched position near Fort Fisher, says:

cled. The next morning after sunrise a frightfulexplosion occurred in my reserve magazine, killingand wounding several hundred of the enemy andsome of my own wounded officers and men. Themagazine was a frame structure 20 x 00 feet and6 feet high, covered with 18 feet or more of sand,luxuriantly turfed, and contained probably 13,000pounds of powder. It made an artificial moundmost inviting to a wearied soldier, and after thefight was occupied for the night by Colonel Alden’s109th New York and by some of my sufferingsoldiers. Two sailors from the fleet, stupefied byliquor which they had found in the hospital, andlooking for booty, were seen to enter the structurewith lights, and a moment after the green moundblew up. The telegraph wires, between a bomb-proof near this magazine across the river to Bat-tery Lamb, gave rise to the impression that ithad been purposely exploded from the oppositeshore, but an official investigation traced it tothe drunken sailors.

So stoutly did those works resist the 50,000shot and shell thrown against them in the twobombardments that not a magazine or bomb-proofwas injured, and after the land armament, withpalisades and torpedoes, had been destroyed, noassault would have been practicable in the pres-ence of Bragg ’s force, had it been under a compe-tent officer. 4 One thousand tons of iron weregathered by the United States from the works.

Had there been no fleet to assist the army atPort Fisher the Federal infantry could not havedared assault it until its land defenses had beendestroyed by gradual approaches. For the first timein the history of sieges the land defenses of theworks were destroyed, not by any act of the be-sieging army, but by the concentrated fire, directand enfilading, of an immense fleet poured uponthem without intermission, until torpedo wireswere cut, palisades breached so that they actuallyafforded cover for assailants, and the slopes of thework were rendered practicable for assault.

“ I put the command in motion, and ordered the enemy dis-lodged if it was at all practicable. General Hoke and his briga-diers made a close recoimoissance and expressed to me theopinion that their troops were unequal to the task. I movedforward with them, and made a close examination, confirmedtheir opinion, and after a conference decided not to attack.An attack and failure would have insured the fall of the fort,and would also have opened the whole State. We couldnot have succeeded without defeating double our numbersbehind intrenchments, while at the same time exposed to araking fire from their fleet. [See p. 642. j . . . Believing

myself that Grant’s army could not storm and carry the fortif it was defended, I felt perfect confidence that the enemylmd assumed a most precarious position, from which he wouldescape with great difficulty. I accordingly ordered Hoke tointrench immediately in Ids front, and push his lines close onhim so as to keep him engaged and closely observed. . . •Had the cavalry done its duty and promptly reported theenemy’s movements, I do not think the result would have beendifferent. Such was the configuration of the country and theobstacles, that he would have accomplished his object withthe force he had. Our only safe reliance was in his repulse,we being the weak and assailed party. . . . The defenseof the fort ought to have been successful against this attack,but it had to fall eventually. The expedition brought againstit was able to reduce it iu spite of all I could do. . .

Editors. *