THE GEORGIA MILITIA DURING SHERMAN’S MARCH TO THE SEA. /
O N the 12th of October, 1864, I was orderedto assemble the State forces of Georgia atLovejoy’s Station, to support the small body of Con-federate cavalry observing the Eederal garrisonof Atlanta , and, by threatening the latter, drawthe attention of General Sherman to that place,whilst his army was in pursuit of Hood, who wasmoving on the Federal line of communications.
At Lovejoy’s Station we were joined by twosmall regiments of Georgia State line troops thathad previously served with the Confederate army,and by several detachments of home guards andwork-shop troops, ordered to report to me by Gen-eral Howell Cobb, commanding in Georgia -On the 15th of November, when General Sher-man’s army started from Atlanta on its famous“march to the sea,” I had at Lovejoy’s Station2800 infantry, 3 batteries, and 250 local reservecavalry, supporting the very small Confederatecavalry force in observation around Atlanta . Sofar as I knew, or had reason to believe, mine wasthe only force, except the cavalry, that was likelyto be brought into the field to oppose Sherman’smarch through the State.
That night I withdrew my command to theintrenchments at Griffin. Early on the 16thWheeler’s cavalry was jammed back to our posi-tion, and the Federals made serious demonstrationson our lines, but no real attack. Late in the after-noon it was ascertained that a large portion of theirforces had passed through McDonough, ten milesor more to the east of us, and were nearer to Macon than we were. I fell back from Griffin at dark,and in less than twenty-four hours reached For-sythe, thirty-five miles distant, just in time to repelthe advance of Sherman’s cavalry and save thelarge depot of supplies at that place. In the mean-time Sherman had commenced crossing to the eastside of the Ocmulgee, and Wheeler had moved overthat river. The next day I withdrew to Macon ,in time to assist in repelling a formidable demon-stration against East Macon, in which the Federalssucceeded in forcing General Wheeler, with a por-tion of his command, to the bank of the Oc-mulgee, in rear of our fortifications. During thenight Wheeler extricated his forces, and passed outto the south and east, thus again placing his cav-alry on the flank and in front of Sherman.
The militia had saved Griffin, Forsythe, andMacon ; but as yet there had been no serious col-lision with the Federals. The face of the countrywas open, the roads were in good order, theweather was fine and bracing, the crops had beengathered, and were ready for use; in short, a com-bination of circumstances favored an easy marchfor Sherman’s army. It was evidently no part ofhis purpose to attack the fortified places in the in-terior of the State. He was only passing throughit to his ultimate destination — subsisting on thecountry along his route, and destroying a greatdeal of property, besides thoroughly breaking up
the railroads, thus cutting off communicationsbetween Richmond and the States of Alabama ,Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida .
When my command reached Macon , the work-shop troops, home guards, local reserve cavalry,and the artillery — except Anderson’s battery—were ordered to report to General Cobb. In themeantime General Beauregard, Lieutenant-Gen-erals Hardee and Richard Taylor, and other officersof prominence, reached Macon , but they brought notroops with them. General Hardee assumed the chiefcommand. Whilst on the field in East Macon , heordered one of the militia brigades to start at onceto Augusta , and a few hours later he ordered meto move, next morning, with the remainder of mycommand and proceed to the same place. A fewhours after I was ordered to move to Augusta General Hardee started to Savannah , and GeneralTaylor succeeded to the command in Macon .Early on the morning of the 2 2d the militiamoved in compliance with Hardee’s order; I re-mained in Macon a few hours for the purpose ofprocuring ammunition, supplies, and transporta-tion, having ordered the senior brigadier-generalpresent with the troops to halt before reachingGriswoldville and wait for further orders. Hewas instructed not to engage the enemy, but, ifpressed, to fall back to the fortifications of EastMacon; or, if necessary, toward the south in thedirection already taken by Wheeler’s cavalry.Contra»y to my instructions the militia becameengaged about one mile beyond Griswoldville, andwere badly cut up. They lost 51 killed and 472wounded, but they remained in close contact withthe enemy until dark. By authority of GeneralTaylor I then withdrew them to Macon and movedby rail to Albany, thence across the country toThomasville, and from the latter point by rail toSavannah . About one thousand of the commandarrived at the latter place at 2 a. m. on the 30thof November.
Immediately upon the arrival of the leading trainin Savannah , before I had left my seat in the car,an officer of Hardee’s staff handed me two orders.The first, dated 10 P. M., November 29th, read:
“ Lieutenant-General Hardee directs that you willproceed at once with the first two trains of your troopswhich may arrive at Savannah to-night, and in the samecars, to Grahamville and Coosawliatcliie, on the Charles-ton and Savannah Railroad, which places ore beingthreatened by raiding parties of the enemy, and if youfind yourself the ranking officer present, that youassume command and drive the enemy back to theirgun-boats.”
The second order was dated one hour later :
“ Lieutenant-General Hardee directs me to say that,from information received, he thinks it best that thefirst train of your troops which arrives shall go toCoosawlmtchie, the farthest point, and the second toGrahamville.”
On receipt of these orders I directed the troopsto remain in the cars, and ordered the two trains
} A continuation of the article on p. 331 .GG7