68o

THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE HARDEE.

over two miles in length, on the South Carolina "bank. Without a pontoon-bridge or other meansof getting away, he was relying only on three verysmall steamboats. The only troops he had on theCarolina bank were a small force of light artilleryand Ferguson’s brigade of Wheeler’s cavalry, num-bering not more than 1000 men. At this timeBeauregard’s “Military Division of the West” didnot embrace the department of General Hardee,although he had authority and discretion there, inan emergency. Therefore he had gone to Charles-ton on December 7th, with a view of saving andconcentrating the scattered Confederate forces inthat region for some effective action against Sher-man. He telegraphed Hardee (December 8th),advising him to hold Savannah as long as practi-cable, but under no circumstances to risk the gar-rison, and to be ready for withdrawal to a junctionwith Major-General Samuel Jones at Pocotaligo,South Carolina . At Hardee’s urgent request Beau-regard went to Savannah on the morning of the9th. Finding no means prepared for the con-tingency of evacuation he directed the immediateconstruction of a pontoon-bridge, with the planta-tion rice-flats (collected at my suggestion) for pon-toons. These, moored by old guns and ear-wheelsfor anchors, were covered with flooring suppliedby pulling down the wharves and wooden build-ings. After giving instructions as to the plan ofoperations, Beauregard returned to Charleston ,Instructions were also given for the best feasibledefense of the causeway and road from Screven’sFerry. On the 14th Hardee telegraphed toBeauregard of the enemy’s movements, his owndoubts and his desire to have specific orders ;and on the 15th he again telegraphed, urgingBeauregard to return and determine the actualtime for the evacuation and junction with Jones.Beauregard (whom I accompanied) went to Sa-vannah on the night of the 16th, in my wagon,running the gauntlet of Foster’s batteries nearPocotaligo so as to save the railroad from ob-struction by an unlucky shot at his train, andtraversing by like conveyance the distance alongwhich the railroad had been broken by Shermannear Savannah , my wagon and pair of horses beingtransported between the breaks in freight-cars.He found the pontoon-bridge only about one-thirdconstructed, some of Wheeler’s cavalry having de-stroyed a number of rice-flats collected, supposingthey had been gathered by Sherman for the cross-ing of the river. But the work was prosecutedwith such vigor by the chief engineer, ColonelJohn G. Clarke, in person, that by daylight of the19th General Beauregard found it all but eom-

3 ) In liis “Memoirs,” Vol. II.,in216, General Sliermanexplains his action at this time as follows:

“On the 18tli of December, at my camp by the side of tileplank-roail, eight miles hack of Savannah , I received Gen-eral Hardee's letter declining to surrender, when nothingremained hut to assault. The ground was diilicult, and, asall former assaults had proved so bloody, I concluded to makeone more effort to completely surround Savannah on all sides,so as further to excite Hardee’s fears, and in case of successto capture his whole army. We had already completelyinvested the place on the north, west, and south, hut thereremained to the enemy on the east the use of the old dyke

pleted, stretching from the city to Hutchinson’sIsland , over which a causeway was built; thenceto Pennyworth Island , where another causeway waslaid; thence across the Back River to a causewaythat led over the swamps to the main-land of theCarolina bank. Beauregard ordered the movementto be made that night, though accident delayed ituntil the night of the 20th, when by this route —the only exit from Savannah — Hardee was safelywithdrawn, with field-artillery, baggage, and stores,and the bridge then destroyed. This was one of theneatest achievements of the war, rivaling in deci-sion, resource, and skill the evacuations of Corinthand of Morris Island by the same commander.

But meanwhile, cautiously leaving his 60,000men concentrated on the Georgia bank of the river,General Sherman had gone in person around bythe sea to Hilton Hoad in order to procure theassistance of Foster’s army for the investmentof Savannah from the Carolina bank. It is clearthat, had Slocum’s suggestion been adopted, orhad even the single brigade of his corps that hadcrossed the river above Savannah been vigor-ously pushed against the thin line of Confederatepickets covering this causeway, all escape fromSavannah must have been cut off. General Sher-man saw his mistake too late, and, in his letter ofDecember 24th, 1864, he excuses himself to Hal-leck: “I feel somewhat disappointed at Hardee’sescape, but really am not to blame. I moved asquickly as possible to close up the Union cause-way, but intervening obstacles were such that, be-fore I could get troops on the road, Hardee hadslipped out.” The real point is that, having anoverwhelming force, his movement should havebeen a prompt and vigorous one to the rear ofSavannah, and not a voyage to Hilton Head to bor-row forces from General Foster. (J) As to “ inter-vening obstacles,” they consisted of some lightartillery and a very thin line of cavalry of which,in his letters, he saw fit to write in the mostdisparaging terms. In this case they seem to havesufficed to cover the retreat of about 10,000 men.

To estimate General Sherman’s error we musthere consider that the Confederate troops in Sa-vannah formed the only substantial force then in-terposed, and the bulk of the only force afterwardinterposed, between him and Grant. From a mili-tary point of view, therefore, this failure was ofimportance. Beauregard had suggested to theGovernment a bold and rapid concentration ofa portion of Lee’s army with the forces that hewas then assembling, in order to try a supremeand decisive blow against Sherman, and, if suc-cessful, then to concentrate all forces upon Grant.

or plank-road leading into South Carolina , and I knew thatHardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river. Onexamining niymnps I thought that the division of John 1*.Hatch, belonging to General roster’s command, might hemoved from its then position at Broad River, by water, downto Bluffton, from which it could reach the plank-road, fortifyand hold it, at some risk, of course, because Hardee couldavail himself of his central position to fall on this detachmentwith his whole army.”

To carry out the purpose Sherman went to HiltonHead , and on the way hack was met with the announce-ment that Hardee had evacuated Savannah.— Editors.