SHERMAN’S MARCH FROM SAVANNAH TO BENTONVILLE. 683
that the militia of the South will have to he kept home. With the balance of your commandcome here with all dispatch.”
In reply, under date of December 13 th, Sherman said:
“ I had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina ,thence to Raleigh , and then to report to you.”
The fall of Savannah resulted in the adoption of the plan which Shermanhad contemplated. I11 a letter dated December 24 th Sherman says:
“ Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why I did not go to South Carolina , andwhen I answered that we were en route for that State, the invariable reply was, ‘ Well, if youwill make those people feel the utmost severities of war we will pardon you for your desolationof Georgia .’ ”
About one month was spent in Savannah in clothing the men and fillingthe trains with ammunition and rations. Then commenced the movementwhich was to make South Carolina feelthe severities of war. The rightwing, with the exception of Corse’s di-vision of the Seventeenth Corps, movedvia Hilton Head to Beaufort. The leftwing with Corse’s division and the cav-alry moved up the west bank of theSavannah River to Sister’s Ferry, dis-tant about forty miles from Savan-nah . Sherman’s plan was similar tothat adopted on leaving Atlanta . Whenthe army had started from Atlanta , the right wing had moved direct towardMacon and the left toward Augusta . Both cities were occupied by Con-federate troops. The movements of our army had caused the Confederateauthorities at each of these important cities to demand not only the reten-tion of the troops at each place, but had induced them to demand help
FORT MCAI.T.ISTER. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
& At this time General Lee addressed the follow-ing letter to the Governor of South Carolina :
“Headquarters, Army N. Va., 27 January, ’65.
“ His Excellency A. G. Magrath, Governor of SouthCarolina, Columbia . Sir: I received to-day your letterof tlie 10th in at., and regret exceedingly to learn thepresent condition of affairs in the South. I infer fromyour letter that you consider me able to send an army toarrest the inarch of General Sherman. If such was thecase I should not have waited for your application, for Ilament as much as you do his past success, and see theinjury that may result from his further progress. Ihave no troops except those within this department,"within which my operations are confined. Accordingto your statement of General Sherman’s force, it wouldrequire this whole army to oppose him. It is now con-fronted by General Grant with a far superior army. Ifit was transferred to South Carolina , I do not believeGeneral Grant would remain idle on the James River.It would be as easy for him to move his army south asfor General Sherman to advance north. You can judgewhether the condition of affairs would be benefited by aconcentration of the two large Federal armies in SouthCarolina , with the rest of the Confederacy stripped ofdefense. But should Charleston fall into the hands ofthe enemy, as grievous as would be the blow and as
painful the result, I cannot concur iu the opinion ofyour Excellency that our cause would necessarily helost. Should our whole coast fall iu the possession of ourenemies, with our people true, firm, and united, the warcould be continued and our purpose accomplished. Aslong as our armies are unsubdued and sustained, theConfederacy is safe. I therefore think it bad policy toshut our troops within intrenchments, where they canbe besieged with superior forces, and prefer operatingin the field. I recommend this course in South Carolina ,and advise that every effort be made to prevent GeneralSherman reaching Charleston hy contesting his advance.The last return made by General Hardee of his forcewhich I have seen, gave his entire strength 20,500 of allarms; with 5000 South Carolina militia which he ex-pected, and 1500 Georgia troops under General G. W.Smith, he would have 27,000. This is exclusive of Con-nor’s brigade and Butler’s division sent from this army,which ought to swell his force to 33,000. But I think itmight be still further increased by a general turnout ofall the men in Georgia and South Carolina. , and thatSherman could be resisted until General Beauregardcould arrive with reinforcements from the West. I seeno cause for depression or despondency, but abundantreason for renewed exertion and unyielding resistance.With great respect, your Excellency’s obedient servant,R. E. Lee , General.” [Printed from the MS.] — Editors.