HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

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indeed under the same natural prohibition, but causes, already explained, pre-vented the direction of their powers into that channel. Owing to this circum-stance, the naval history of the world, which, in consequence of the unimprovedstate of navigation, and the obscurity of all information, in respect to theother quarters of the globe, is unavoidably confined to Europe, becomes addi-tionally contracted. Even the eastern empire, and its foes the Saracens, werepossessed of no permanent naval force. Their gallies and fleets, fitted out for thepurpose of carrying into effect desultory expeditions, were generally abandonedto the ravages of time, soon as their first object w as rendered successful, or abor-tive. The system of constantly maintaining a fleet, so as to be ready at a shortnotice, to repel the foes of its country, w'as a refinement which, though it hadin some respects prevailed during those wars W'hich Rome had been engagedin, during her long and uninterrupted struggle for the acquisition of universal,or at least extensive empire, yet the curtailment of that dominion, and the dere-liction of the principle, rendered unavoidable by the inroads of the Goths, andtheir successors, had caused a total suspension of the measure. A variety ofcauses contributed to give birth to this conduct, which, without some explana-tion, may be thought more unwise than it in reality was. The first objectionto a perseverance in it, was that of expence, which, except on extraordinaryemergencies, the empire of the east w r as very ill able to sustain, considering theimmense military force it w^as absolutely necessary should be constantly kept onfoot, for the defence of the frontiers ; though notwithstanding every precaution,the armies of its invaders frequently found means to penetrate even to thecapital itself. The second reason was in all probability founded on the hastewith which, comparatively with modern times, the fleets, then used, could benot only equipped, but even constructed; while the third, which, perhaps, wasnot the least forcible, though the most absurd of the whole, w'as the constantinfatuated hope, that the quietude or avocations, as well of the Saracens asother formidable enemies, would not render even the equipment of a fleet,much less its maintenance, necessary. This is a species of folly which, thoughrepeated and fatal experience has so often proved a political crime, has never-theless been frequently apparent in the conduct of various countries, from theearliest ages to the present moment.

The Saracens on their part fell nearly into the same habits, because they notonly were, what might be called naturally, more addicted to enterprises of a mi-litary, than of a nautical nature, but also because they placed their chief hopesYol. I. IT h on