HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

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armament in question had extended through the sea-ports of Asia, Macedonia,Greece, and the islands in the Aegean sea : it conveyed, without inconve-nience, forty-nine thousand one hundred and twenty-seven soldiers or sailors,a motley mixture of Greeks, Russians, Mardiates, and refugees from variouscountries. Independent of the crews, such an immense quantity of stores andprovisions was taken on board, that in the language of the historian, thefancy is bewildered by the almost endless recapitulation of arms and engines,of clothes and of linen, of bread for the men, and forage for the horses, withstores and utensils of every description, better suited to the establishment ofan extensive and flourishing colony, than to the conquest of a petty and insig-nificant island. v

The sum required for the payment of the troops and mariners, prove eitherthat the value of money was considerably inferior to what it was little more thana century since, or that the pay of a seaman, as well as soldier, had by somevery strange revolution, dwindled, a century or two later, almost into nothing.It amounted, according to the calculation of those who are best informed, tono less a sum than one hundred and thirty-two thousand pounds sterling permonth, and nearly six times exceeded what the maintenance of such an arma-ment, sent forth from Britain in the reign of Edward the Third, would haveamounted to.

The fact just stated is in itself so striking, as to render it unnecessary toadduce any farther argument to shew that a naval war, under the variouscircumstances which then affected the Grecian empire, was an undertakingnot to be entered upon slightly, or without consideration; and it serves alsoto point out the reason why the empire became averse to the maintenance of anaval force, except in cases where necessity actually and peremptorily de*manded it. To turn the eye at once to a distant quarter of Europe, England,after being divided into so many states as was the case during the Heptarchy,having become united, and subject to the dominion of one personage only,might reasonably have been expected to have risen so superior in consequenceto those enemies who, when in its disunited state had proved incapable ofeffecting by force of arms any greater degree of injury than that which wasmerely of a temporary and partial nature, as to have intimidated, even by theterror of its power, any repetition of assault, or even insult. The event,fcowever, proved far otherwise. Its northern foes, allured by the superior fer-tility of the soil, and the plunder which their succes es afforded them, became

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