HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

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together with nearly ten thousand of their seamen, a manifest proof, that althoughthese northern kingdoms were very little known to the rest of Europe as maritimepowers, their contests, confined to that remote quarter of the world, were notless sanguinary, nor were the numbers and force of the vessels brought intoaction much inferior to those of countries which, situated in the more temperatelatitudes, arrogated to themselves a much higher rank as potentates in thatparticular class. It remained, however, for the pre-eminent genius, and theabilities of their justly famed sovereign, Gustavus Adolphus, to raise themaritime genius and skill of this people into more public notice. In 1617, heequipped a numerous fleet of transports, which were convoyed by a sufficientnumber of vessels armed for war, an armament with which he attacked, andmade himself master of that very important city Riga. After this time, thoughimmediate necessity did not require the subsequent equipment of any force tillthe rupture which took place between that monarch and the House of Austria,in 1630, so diligently did he apply himself to the augmentation of his marine,that he had, before the commencement of hostilities, a fleet ready for immediateservice, consisting of no less than seventy sail, the smallest of which mountedtwenty guns, many of them more than thirty, and some of them forty, orupwards. In any contest with an enemy, professedly destitute of all mari-time strength, little or no room for enterprise could be expected on the partof a fleet. All the service it could be intended for was, first, the protection ofany desultory expeditions, which could be attempted from the seaward, orthe convoy of troops to any part which might be accessible to shipping ; andsecondly, as a provision against a sudden attack from any power better pro-vided with a fleet, which the House of Austria might have address enoughto draw into the quarrel.

The precaution cannot be said to have been needless, although no existingnecessity appeared, which, in unequivocal terms, manifested its wisdom orits use. The equipment of the fleet might, without much stretch of ima-gination, be supposed to preclude that necessity, as no measure is mo r elikely to prevent a state, as an auxiliary, from interfering in a public dispute,than a certainty that its opponent is perfectly ready to punish its officiousness.The death of this heroic monarch, at the battle of Lutzen, on the 6th of Novem-ber, 1632, in no degree impeded the exertions and activity of the state: the sameenergy which his wise regulations had once given birth to, were in no degree

relaxed