HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

443

So early as the month of March 1689, a fleet, consisting of thirty sail*, leftthe ports of France, destined for Ireland; but the force of the squadron sent byWilliam to oppose it, argued either a natural and irremediable weakness, or awant of energetic exertion. It amounted to no more than twelve ships of twodecks, with five inferior vessels ; and though afterwards reinforced, exceedednot, at the time the action took place, eighteen ships of two decks, with foursmall frigates, too inconsiderable to bear any share in the action. Frenchhistorians have taken some pains to lessen the disparity of force, in order toexcuse their own discomfiture. According to their account, the number of theirships present at the battle of Bantry Bay, exceeded not twenty-four, mountingfrom forty-eight to sixty-two guns; but English writers, on the contrary side,are equally positive in their report, that the French had twenty-eight sail of theline actually engaged in that encounter. To speak candidly, admiral Herbert,the British commander, and monsieur Chateau de Renaud, the French admiral,entered into the encounter with different impressions. Herbert was well aware<?f the advantage that would result to his country, should he be fortunate enoughto destroy the armament of the enemy: success would have damped their futureexertions ; and defeat would have left James, together with the whole Frenchsoldiery who invaded Ireland, an easy prey to the arms of William the Third.France, on the other hand, had no benefit nearly so consequential to expect, evenfrom the total defeat of the British squadron. The force which the admiral ofLouis had escorted, was safely put on shore at the place of its destination : ithad over-run, and nearly made itself master, of the whole kingdom of Ireland ;so that policy required nothing should be put to the hazard which mighttend to interrupt the communication between that country and France. Eachcommander appears to have acted on these principles; but the spirit withwhich Herbert made the desperate attack, was as successful as reason couldhave expected, considering the inequality of his force. The French were somuch worsted as to be compelled to retreat; and though the English were notfortunate enough to acquire any of those substantial proofs of victory whichare naturally expected as consequent to it, yet the spirit which the limitedsuccess just mentioned infused through every department of the naval service,fully compensated the risk, and expence of the encounter.

The remark said to have been made by William in consequence of theevent just mentioned, places the conduct of admiial Herbert exactly in the

* See p. 313.

point