13

HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

harbour of Toulon, In the month of June preceding, found only eight ships ofthe line ready for sea, and one which was careeming, all the rest being totally dis-mantled, or laid up, without any apparent intentiton of their being speedily broughtforward into service. From this circumstance, as iis properly remarked by historians,he naturally concluded the information he had received was true, that the Frenchhad no intention, or, to speak nearer the truth perhaps, were not able to fit outany fleet or force whatever, exceeding that already stated.

From this time France appears to have pattiently adopted the resolution ofpermitting the combined powers to carry on whatever naval operations theythought proper in the Mediterranean, without making the smallest attempt togive them disturbance or interruption. Fleets off transports, laden with stores, orfilled with troops, were perpetually passing between Italy and Spain, under veryslender convoys, though the French force at Toulon far outnumbered that ofits allied antagonists employed in the same quarter. The natural situation of thecountry renders, as it were, two distinct navies necessary both to its protection,and the annoyance of its foes in time of war. Liouis adopted a different scheme ofmanagement for each: previous to the commencement of hostilities, he seemsto have arranged his whole plan, and to have acted according to that ar-rangement, as far as circumstances permitted lhim, during the whole war. Heresolved to keep the principal part of his naval force in the Mediterranean, ima-gining that his opponents would consequently fiind it necessary to detach thitherthe principal part of their navies; and, by that mteans, leave the Atlantic more opento his depredations. He had another reason,, also, for this conduct'; whichin all probability, weighed no less forcibly witlh him than the former: the shipssent through the Strelghts, by the Confederated Powers, would be removed a con-siderable distance from their own harbours ; and should they sustain any injury,either from tempests, or in action, their returm to a friendly port, where theycould procure assistance, might be difficult, if not impossible. The ships of Eng-land and Holland must pass at least a month fnom the time of their quitting Bri-tain, ere they could come in contact with those of France ; there was, conse-quently, the natural chance of contrary winds and tempests to be calculated onfor their annoyance, while the fleet of Louis could lay quietly, and withoutincurring any such risk, till the very moment almiost arrived, when an engagementshould be deemed politically prudent. The phan was judiciously laid, but ingreat measure failed : this was ow'ing, however, ruot to any defect in the plan itself,but the incompetency of the French naw to render it effective. The check, forVol. III. C it