15

HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

after a dispute no less obstinate than that which took place on the former occasion,succeeded in capturing or destroying the Cumberland and Devonshire, both ofthem three-decked ships, carrying 80 guns, with the Chester and Ruby, of 50each. Several other entcrprizes, of a similar nature, were also projected, andearned into execution with varied and perhaps less consequential success thanthe two just mentioned. The mere attempts, however, had they been completelyfoiled, added to the provision made from the same source for the safety and pro-tection of their Weft Indian and American colonies, where, considering the greatdisadvantage under which the enemy certainly appear to have laboured, verylittle impression was made, or advantage gained by the British, plainly provethe French marine to have acquired such wonderful strength, that nothing but thegreatest activity and most unremitted diligence could possibly have checked itsgrowing power.

The expedition, fitted out in the year 1708, under the command of the Count deForbin, and sent on the coast of Scotland for the purpose of covering a descent in-tended to be made there, under the auspices of Louis, in favour of the Pretender,being completely unsuccessful, appears to have had the same effect in restrain-ing all future operations on so extensive a scale, as the battle ol Malaga had inanother quarter. The utmost stretch of subsequent hope exceeded not the for-tuitous interruption of some nearly defenceless convoy, or the casual success of twoor three cruizers, venturing out in company, and fortunately meeting with someprize, so inferior to themselves in force as to render resistance almost an act ofculpable temerity.—Nothing can more forcibly display the relative conditions ofthe French and British marine, together with the resources possessed at that timeby each country in support of it, than their different actions on the occasion of thisexpedition. France, it is true, had experienced losses during the war, amountingto more than 40 ships of the line, besides a multitude of frigates and vessels of in-ferior rate. These, of themselves, constituted a navy that would not be con-sidered otherwise than respectable; but she still possessed, including the fleetwhich lay inactive at Toulon, a force of 70 ships of two and three decks, withupwards of 100 frigates and vessels of inferior rate.

Such, however, w r as the ascendancy acquired by Britain at this period, that whileLouis was, through his repeated disasters, compelled to leave the defence of IiisWeltIndia colonies ; of his possessions on the coast of America ; the protection of theshattered remnant of that Trans-Atlantic commerce, the preservation of which,contemptible as it was, required his best efforts; in short, his whole system of

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