48

HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

extensive seale of naval opt rations. Six two or three-deckecl ships, the Cumber-land and the Devonshire, of eighty guns; the Grafton and the Hampton-Court ofseventy ; with the Chester and Ruby, of fifty guns each, fell into the hands of theenemy, together with a considerable number of valuable merchant vessels, in whosedeicnce tie utmost gallantry was exerted. Notwidislanding, however, theseirremediable accidents, the navy became actually increased one ship of the lineand two trigates, within the last twelve months. The failure of the expedition,undertaken by the French court in behalf of the Pretender, proved, in 1708, thew onderful energy which England, in case of necessity, was capable of exertingwith regard to her marine*. It extinguished the then nearly expiring hopes ofFrance, and the war might be said to continue, like the remains of a conflagra-tion, w'hich having already consumed what was considered valuable, the extin-guishment of the embers w'as considered as an useless labour.

Not, however, to pass in total silence over the period which intervened ere the-pcace of Utrecht actually took place, fleets were annually equipped, and thecommand of them given to officers not inferior, either in spirit or ability, to thoseunder whose conduct Britain had most proudly triumphed. But Louis, warnedby his misfortunes, confined himself merely to the defensive system, wdiether inthe Mediterranean or on the Atlantic ; so that the services of Sir John Jennings, SirJohn Norris, Sir John Leake, and Mr. Aylmer, were confined merely to the atten-tion of keeping their fleet in constant order to repel the enemy, in case they shouldbe hardy enough to venture out of their own ports.

Such were the exertions made by Biitain, in defence of her own coasts, and inthe attack of those belonging to her enemy: but, though those particulars which havebeen slenderly recounted might have been deemed a sufficient proof of her mari-time strength and consequence, yet, others made by her in distant quarters, whereshe had no succour or assistance from her allies, fully proved her strength to beequal to every necessity, and that the non-reduction of every colony possessed byFrance, in the West Indies, as w'ell as other parts of the world, w'as far frombeing ascribable to any want of efficient force employed on those stations. Com-plaints, indeed, succeeded to complaints; disaffection or cowardice, at one time;want of co-operation in the collateral branches of the sendee, at another; and avariety of inferior causes, united in rendering the events of w'ar, generally unsuccess-ful, not unfrequently disastrous, and sometimes even di c graceful. These occurrences,however, were by no means attributable to the force and quality of the squadrons

* See page 16.

employed