HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE-
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trigates. This force, which consisted of no more than twelve sail of the line, formedthe principal part of all the naval strength possessed by Spain in the Atlantic.Detached squadrons, on other services, she possessed none; nor, at this period ofthe war, had she any number of single ships employed as cruizers. It appears, there-fore, that except the squadron stationed in the Weft Indies, for the purpose of formingsome species of check to the Englifh in that quarter, the whole of her marine, evenincluding such vessels of force as were unavoidably employed in the conveyance oftheir treasure from one part of the globe to another, exceeded not thirty ships oftwo decks, with about the same number of frigates. In the American seas, thepreservation of the Spanish colonies seems to have been in a much greater degreeowing to the strength of their fortifications, the inclemency of the climate, andseveral instances of mismanagement which took place on the part of Britain, thanto any protection they, did, or could derive from their ships of war. Few of themever came into contact with those of Britain, exclusive of those already mentioned,except the Princessa and Glorioso, of 70 guns each, both of them captured at dif-ferent periods; the Africa and Invincible, of 74 guns; the Conquestador, theDragon, the New-Spain, and the Royal-Family, of 64 guns each ; with the Galga,of 36. The seven last-mentioned vessels composed the squadron under admiralReggio, which engaged Mr. Knowles off the Havannah, in the month of Novem-ber, 1748 ; in consequence of which action the Conquestador was taken, and theAfrica totally destroyed.
The attention of Spain appears, indeed, to have been applied during the war in afar greater degree to the general improvement of her marine than to the augmenta-tion of it; and it is not difficult to point out the reason of this conduct. The adoptedmeasure rested more on science itself,, which the most impotent nation, however lowits condition might be, had it in its power to cultivate. The contrary expedient re-quired an ability and resource beyond the reach, and which no exertion, perhaps,was capable of supplying. A secondary reason, also, might assist in producingthis conduct: for, soon as France had rashly and inconsiderately involved herself inthe quarrel, the different departments appear to have been allotted to each, whichthey were separately best able to fill. France, as possessed of the most powerfulmeans of actual annoyance, undertook that part of the task ; and Spain, in whomthe mean's of providing or recompensing that annoyance principally resided, ad-dressed herself, with* all becoming assiduity, to protect her wealth, and the sub-sidies of her ally, safe into her own ports.
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France,