HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

I IT

France, though not under the same difficulties, or labouring under the samenatural incapacity with Spain, had suffered, as already observed, her marine todiminish considerably, both in respect to the number of vessels themselves, and thatof the guns mounted collectively on board them. 'When the treaty of peace was con-cluded, the navy of the former country consisted of seventy-eight ships of the line,(speaking as closely as the best information from private documents, and the collationof public testimonies, will allow posterity to judge,) nearly twenty of which were ofthree decks, mounting from ninety to one hundred and ten guns. This force had, inthe space of thirty-one years, decreased upwards of thirty sail; nor was there a singleship in the French navy, which, at the re-commencement of hostilities, or duringthe continuance of them, was brought into service, that ranked nominally higherthan a British third-rate, or mounted more than 80 guns. Upon the whole, how-ever, the French marine could not merit the disgraceful reproach of having beensuffered to fall materially into decay. The numbers in which it had experiencedthe diminution, had, both in a scientific and political light, been more than com-pensated for by the superior and improved qualities of those newly-built vessels bywhich the place of their predecessors had been supplied, Britain, on the otherhand, had pursued the contrary measure. Her numbers had increased, but thecharacter of vessels composing her marine had certainly not experienced thesmallest amendment during the same interval. The event carried with it theconsequence which might naturally have been expected from it. France, with aforce so apparently inferior, maintained an active and spirited resistance; and, tillthose losses took place which bcfel that country toward the conclusion of the war,her efforts against the commerce of Britain were as successful as could reasonablyhave been expected from the most decided superiority. Iiifforians, who have col-lected the different accounts with much apparent care, make the number of shipstaken from Britain amount to upwards of three thousand sail; a strong and veryconvincing proof that the cruizcrs of the enemy were neither inactive, nor incon-siderable in number. This will appear more evident, when, by a comparisonmade with the numbers of ships taken from France or Spain, during the same in-terval, by Britain, her prizes, notwithstanding her acknowledged superiority ofmarine strength, appear not to have exceeded her losses more than two hundredsail: certainly a very small comparative advantage, when the numbers of hercruizcrs, and her boasted naval pre-eminence is considered. This undoubtedly is'a circumstance which proves, almost beyond controversy, the advantage which theFrench and Spanish ships at that time held over those of the British, in respect toVol. III. Q. sailing,