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Vol. III.
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HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

137

tial enough to throw an appearance of inaccuracy or waste over any detail of ex-penditure that might be given in the aggregate, were that point but imper-fectly explained. The variation in the quantity of materials required to build twoships of the same rate, and nearly of the same burthen, is extremely curious:every change of system brought with it an alteration of expence ; and unless thewhole of those voluminous records which the labours even of a multitude of per-sons could not sufficiently explore and digest into regular order, except by theclosest attention of their whole lives, were brought into one point of view,it would be extremely improper to say, that the persons charged with the conductof marine affairs, during the reign of king William, were fraudulent, or those ofany subsequent reign extravagant. The marine service of Britain is not to be con-ducted on the narrow principle of strict (economy, for on some occasions the paltrysaving even of ten thousand pounds, might prove of material ill consequence tothe service of the country. During the administration of Sir Robert Walpole,including the long peace which succeeded the treaty of Utrecht, and the greaterpart of the war which followed it, one of the principal objections started againstthe increase of the British navy, with respect to dimensions, was the extravagantexpence that would necessarily attend such an alteration. But it appears, from au-thentic papers, that this opinion was very incorrect, for it will be found the Tri-umph of 74 guns, though of the most enlarged dimensions, required a considerablyless quantity of materials to construct her, than even the Mars, which was threehundred tons less than herself; while on the other hand, the Thunderer, of74 guns only, required nearly eighty loads of timber more than the PrincessAmelia, which was in the class or rate above her.

There appears, indeed, to have been much want of knowlege in respect tothe requisites of a ship of war. The points that were considered as conducive toperfection were extremely ill-ascertained, and obstinately defended by prejudice,in opposition to experience : nor was it, till after a long and serious proof ofdefects, that an alteration of system was adopted. The investigation was carefullyand diligently pursued, but the effects of it were not completely felt, till the expira-tion of fourteen or fifteen years. This circumstance, by carrying the system beyondthe year 1750, may seem to create a species of confusion in principles, which itis, in fact, necessary to connect, in order to shew the whole of the new system,although it causes a deviation from that regular division ot sections, which, it notexplained, might be considered as an anachronism. The inconveniences and_ im-proprieties of construction which then marked the British ships oi war, and certainly

rendered