HISTORY OF MARINE ARCHITECTURE.

people, of conveying them at their own risk to the place of their destination.This arrangement was, nevertheless, extremely injurious to what may be con-sidered the naval consequence of the country itself; but that is a circumstancewhich the political directors of the government have had the wisdom to discovercannot be remedied, and have therefore possessed sufficient prudence not tomake the vain attempt, conscious that those countries of Europe, whose navieshave acquired them the appellation of maritime powers, would not suffer themost distant attempt to be made that might appear likely to erect a force whichmight come in competition with their own. The equipment of a Turkish fleethas always therefore appeared as a constrained act of necessity, imposed onthe government of the country, and a violence done to the wishes of the people,who considered the defence of their sovereign and themselves could not be con-fided to better hands than the ardour of their janissaries and their spahis.

According to the arrangement and order heretofore pursued, the navy ofGreat Britain comes next under consideration. Its flourishing state at the con-elusion of the war with France and Spain in 1748, has been already descantedon. During the peace, which succeeded to it, there was no relaxation from thoseenergetic measures which had been adopted towards its improvement, more par-ticularly subsequent to the year 1745. If the number of ships newly built should-bethought insignificant when compared with those launched by France and Spainduring the same period, ample amends were undoubtedly made for the deficiencyin this respect, by the diligence used in the repair of such ships as either age,or the incidents which took place during the preceding state of warfare, had ren-dered unfit for engaging in any further contest, or, perhaps, even being employedon services where no encounter was to be apprehended, without the previousadoption of those precautions which were prudently and necessarily to betaken. Sosuccessful were the quiet measures pursued by Britain, that notwithstanding theboasted energy and exertions made by France, in what may fairly be considered there-formation of her navy, (a circumstance which, though it proclaims the low andinsignificant state into which it had fallen, reflects considerable honour on thoseunder whose auspices its revivalm so short a time was effected) no apprehensionsof misfortune would have been roused, though Spain, the quondam ally toFrance,and whose efforts in the same line had been no less strained,should have thoughtproper to join herself as a partner in the dispute, even at its very commencement.

In 1755, a rupture with France being daily expected, the British fleet actu-ally in commission, and ready for immediate service, amounted to two firstrates, of one hundred guns each; five second rates, of ninety guns; twenty-

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