J A J \1 ES II. 19.1

and had a tcndencc to render kingly power en-tirely dependent and precarious: That where thesovereign, from his tender years, from lunacy,or from other natural infirmity, was incapacitatedto hold the reins of government, both the lawsand former practice agreed in appointing a regent,who, during the interval, was invested with thewhole power of the administration: That theinveterate and dangerous prejudices of king Jameshad rendered him as unfit to sway the Englishsceptre, as if he had fallen into lunacy; and itwas therefore natural for the people to haverecourse to the same remedy : That the electionof one king was a precedent for the election ofanother; and the government, by that means,would either degenerate into a republic , or ,what was worse, into a turbulent and seditiousmonarchy : That the cafe was still more dan-gerous, if there remained a prince, who claimedthe crown by right of succession , and disputed,on so plausible a ground, the title of the presentsovereign : That though the doctrine of non-resistance might not , in every possible circum-stance, be absolutely true, yet was the belief ofit very expedient; and to establish a government,which should have the contrary principle for itsbasis, was to lay a foundation for perpetual revo-lutions and convulsions : That the appointmentof a regent was indeed exposed to many incon-veniences ; but so long as the line of successionwas preserved entire, there was still a prospect ofputting an end, some time or other, to the public

It A PLXXI.I6t9,