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was just now shewn impossible. Any otherbeing could never know whether it had sucha degree of perceptivity, or not; since itcould do nothing more to discover it, thanmatter that had no perception: that is, it isimpossible the person who asserted this, couldever have any ground for his affertion. Andlastly, from such perceptivity thinking couldnever be produced; for thinking implies ac-tive perception, or aBivity joined with per'ceptivity. For which cause it is that, thoirrational animals are percipient, and also ac-tive in willing motion; yet wanting the otherspecies of activity, the spontaneous directionof their perceptive capacity towards and throtheir past perceptions, they cannot be calledthinking creatures.

XXIX. But really matter hath no suchperceptivity at all: for of what could it b epercipient ? Not of its own action in tno^'ing, nor of its internal operations in thinking)all action in it being impossible. Thus )would have no object to be perceived,should be said that it might be percipient 0the action of other matter upon it; not tomention that action is impossible in all