therefore naturally immortal. 235

at these parts, of which we have been speak-ing, it is well: but if we are forced to allowof active perceptive substances that do notconsist of parts; why should we contend atall for parts in such substances from the be-ginning? And if we contend jor parts at all,what reason can there be given for stoppingat these parts, and not contending for otherand other parts in infinitum , which will makethe absurdity monstrous? And in either case,the activity and perceptivity of the whole couldnever be one simple and uncompounded ac-tivity and perceptivity; or be individual to it yin opposition to the parts: but contrarily, theactivity and perceptivity of each part wouldhave its principle of individuality in that part yin opposition to the whole j and all together,they would appear various, confused, and di-vided; and one individual living being couldnever result from them. If it should be said,that the activity and perceptivity of each partwould not be different from that of another ;it is as if we should fay, the subjects of inhesi-on of these properties would not be differentthe one from the other, or that these parts arebut one and the same part, or that the soul isHot made up of parts, or is indivisible.

IX. The